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I. INTRODUCTION

Heightened fears of increased crime may lead to a belief that society should
turn its attention away from the rights of the accused and toward an emphasis on
public safety. These fears, and their accompanying shift in public priorities, may
carry the voters and their representatives on a wave of retributive emotion to
enact laws that might otherwise have faced more intense scrutiny. Assembly Bill

971 (hereinafter "AB 971"),1 California's "Three Strikes" law (hereinafter "Three
Strikes"), 2 and its practically identical twin, Proposition 184, 3 are recent illustrations of this phenomenon.
While similar bills failed in the California State Legislature,4 Three Strikes,
representing a more draconian answer to demands for safer communities, suc-

ceeded overwhelmingly both in the Legislature and at the polls. 5 Three Strikes
appealed to voters because it promised to bring about a safer environment during

a groundswell of anti-crime emotions brought about by high-profile media
coverage of violent offenses. 6 The law's authors intended it to help reduce the
number of serious and violent crimes across California by requiring judges to

hand down greatly enhanced penalties for recidivist offenders.8 California voters
believed this promise of reduced crime-as evidenced by their overwhelming approval of Proposition 184-while several high-profile instances of violent crimes
committed by repeat felons against innocent victims in 1993 and 1994 provided
additional fuel for the public outrage leading to Three Strikes' approval. 9

1.
1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 12, sec. 1, at 56 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 667).
2.
Due to the similarity between AB 971 and Proposition 184, the phrase "'Three Strikes" will be used
to refer collectively to the laws enacted by these two acts unless otherwise specified.
3.
Increased Sentences. Repeat Offenders. Initiative Statute, Proposition 184, Section 1 (codified at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12).
4.
See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (describing unsuccessful legislative alternatives to
Three Strikes).
5.
See James Richardson, Wilson Set to Approve "Three Strikes" Measure, SACRAmENTo BEE, Mar.
4, 1994, at Al (reporting the vote in the State Senate as 29-7 in favor with equally lopsided approval in the
Assembly); Debra J.Saunders, Three Sprays and You're Out, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1994, at A22 (tallying
the vote on AB 971 at 92 out of 120 legislators in favor); State Propositions:Election 1994: California,SAN
DImO UNIoN-TRm., Nov. 9. 1994, at A3 [hereinafter State Propositions](reporting the final vote for Proposition 184 at 72%).
6.
See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing public outrage over violent crime and its
effect on popular support for anti-crime legislation).
7.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a recidivist as a habitual criminal or
repeat offender that is incorrigible or makes a trade of crime); see also Note, Selective Incapacitation:
Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512-32 (1982) (discussing the
problem of recidivism, state efforts to address the problem, and use of the concept of selective incapacitation
as a means of reducing the crime rate); infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text (addressing Three Strikes
as a concept of collective incapacitation).
8. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (setting forth Three Strikes' sentence enhancement
features).
9.
See Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, CaliforniaElections/Propositions,L.A. TimEs, Nov. 10, 1994,
at A3 (reporting Proposition 184's unusual success at the polls); see also infra notes 36-41 and accompanying
text (discussing the swelling of public support leading to the passage of Three Strikes).
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Proponents of Three Strikes, claiming to speak for the general public, opined that,
if only the law had incapacitated these repeat offenders before their final acts of
violence, the innocent lives depicted in sensational media accounts might have
been saved. 0
Thus, Three Strikes may be one solution to the problem of rising crime; but
perhaps, in the words of Shakespeare, it is better to "bear those ills we have than
fly to others that we know not of.""l Three Strikes is, by many accounts, a poorly
drafted and confusing piece of legislation with serious functional and constitutional problems, and amounts to a massive and costly experiment to see if sharply
increasing sentence terms will significantly deter crime.' It claims to save wouldbe victims by incapacitating criminals before they have the opportunity to strike
again, but will it have its claimed effect? Even if it does accomplish its goals,
does it do so at too great a human and economic cost? Will constitutional and
other legal and administrative challenges ultimately defeat Three Strikes?
This Legislative Note seeks to address these and other issues as well as to
answer the following questions: Will Three Strikes be successful, and will it continue to enjoy broad public support? Part II discusses the forces that brought
Three Strikes to its ultimate passage in the Legislature and at the polls. Part III
describes the functional elements of California's three strikes law and of recidivist statutes in other states, along with legislative and judicial attempts to mod-

ify or weaken the California law's provisions. Part IVexplores the legal issues
raised by Three Strikes, while Part V will consider its economic ramifications.
Finally, this Note will conclude that, despite its problems and expected challenges, Three Strikes reflects the current desire of the people and will probably
remain operative until and unless its costs outweigh its benefits.
II. BACKGROUND
Growing public outrage over the burgeoning incidence of violent crime in the
United States has fueled a movement of public opinion toward tougher sanctions

10. Al Locher, Assistant Chief Deputy, Sacramento County District Attorney's Office, Debate Against
Peter Vlautin, Supervisor, Career Criminal Unit, Sacramento County Public Defender's Office, at the
University of California, Davis, Oct. 27, 1994 (recording on file with the Pacific Law Journal)[hereinafter
Debate]; see id. (discussing Peter Vlautin's statement purporting to reflect popular sentiments regarding the
reasons behind the desire to incapacitate repeat offenders).
I1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. i.
12. See Stephen Green, CourtPanelDiscoversMajor Flawsin Three Strikes, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRIB.,
Apr. 9, 1994, at A3 (citing an informal opinion by the Judicial Council of California that Three Strikes, as
drafted, was confusing and ambiguous, and that some of its provisions should not be applied to sentences); see
also Debra J. Saunders, Is It Back to the Bastille?, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 4, 1994, at A22 (suggesting that the
language of Three Strikes will result in successful constitutional challenges because petty felons may suffer
grossly unproportional sentences).
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for felons. 3 Newspaper articles and editorials have harangued readers and
viewers with images of decaying public safety, while television shows depicting
real arrests have soared in popularity. 14 The result is reflected in recent public
opinion polls that show an increase in the percentage of Americans who believe
that crime is the main problem facing the country today from four percent in
February of 1993 to nineteen percent in January of 1994.15 Other figures reflect
a similar upward trend with an increase in the percentage of Americans ranking
crime as one of the country's most important problems from twenty-one percent
in June of 1993 to forty-three percent in January of 1994.16 Thus, Americans now
rank their concern over crime higher than for public morality (twelve percent), the
economy (eleven percent), unemployment (ten percent), government and politics
(nine percent), and the budget deficit (five percent). 7
California, like the nation, has experienced a similar growth in public distress
over rising crime statistics with citizens pressuring state legislators to stop the
epidemic of random violence against persons and property.'8 Whether this fear
is based on a real or perceived growth in violent crime has a different answer, depending on whether long-term or short-term crime-rate trends are considered.

13. See W. John Moore, Shooting in the Dark, NAT. J., Feb. 12, 1994, at 358 (citing the results of a
recent NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll revealing that 93% of those surveyed desired that the President and
Congress pass some form of tough anti-crime measure in 1994). Although some data show a decrease in the
crime rate since its peak in 1981, the statistics are confusing, with differing results depending on the study, the
region, the crime, and the criminal. Id. at 358. This fact, combined with "horror stories fueling public outrage"
have propelled the crime issue to a position of prominence. Id. at 360.
14. See Sam Stanton, It Was Simpson-and So Much More, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 1, 1995, at Al
(recapping the top stories of 1994 and emphasizing a popular movement against crime and support for tougher
anti-crime measures); see also Robin Andersen, "Reality" TV and Criminal Justice; Programs That Film
Police Conduct, HUMANIsT, Sept. 1994, at 8 (discussing the popularity of so-called "reality-based" programming and the sociological antecedents and implications of shows such as "American Detective," "America's
Most Wanted," "Cops," "Night Beat," and "Top Cops"). Stanton attempts to confirm the intuitive conclusion
that such reality-based television shows affect the way people perceive crime, and argues that they have
increased the public's misunderstanding of criminal-justice issues. Id. at 12. Whether the public's heightened
awareness reflects a misunderstanding is an open question in view of recent crime statistics. See infra notes
19-25 and accompanying text (interpreting crime statistics that appear, upon cursory examination, to be inconclusive with respect to growth in the crime rate).
15. See Richard Lacayo, Lock 'Em Up and ThrowAway the Key, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 50 (citing the
results of a telephone poll of 1000 adult Americans taken from January 17-18, 1994 for Time/CNN by
Yankelovich Partners Inc.).
16. Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, A Nation with Perilon Its Mind, L.A. TimS, Feb. 13, 1994, at
Al (reporting the results of a Los Angeles Times poll of 1516 respondents taken from January 15-19, 1994).
Younger Americans also appear to place concern for crime at the top of their lists of important issues according
to an MTVpoll. Moore, supra note 13, at 358 (assessing support for the national crime bill by citing the results
of a recent MTV poll of people between the ages of 16 and 29 that showed respondents ranking the issue of
crime over unemployment and the economy).
17. Lacayo, supranote 15, at 50.
18. See Rene Lynch, "Three Strikes" Case Leniency Is Out in Orange County, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1994, at A41 (describing "public outcry over the criminal justice system's seeming inability to keep habitual
offenders behind bars"); see also Leslie Goldberg, Searchfor Solutions to Juvenile Crime; Helpfor Youngest,
Harsh Treatmentfor Repeaters Proposed,S.F. EXAM., Mar. 2, 1994, at Al (focusing on juvenile crime and
observing that "public outcry over increasingly violent youth crime is pushing government leaders to consider
harsher treatment of young offenders," both in San Francisco and throughout the nation).
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While short-term statistics may reflect modest drops in the national crime
rate, long-term data suggest that the trend is still arching upward. Although the
national rate of violent crime reportedly dropped by three percent in the first six
months of 1993, the long-term statistics show an increase in the murder rate from
8.4 murders per 100,000 people in 1988 to 9.3 murders per 100,000 people in
1992, reflecting a 14.92% increase. 19 This same period saw a 33.55% increase in
the number of murders in California, ranking the state at number eight in murderrate growth. 2° The long-term period from 1988 to 1992 showed a similar increase
in the number of violent crimes of 23.37% for the nation and 31.96% for California. 2' An even broader look at crime trends reveals a startling 371% increase
in the violent crime rate in the United States since 1960, representing a trend nine
times higher than the population growth rate. 22 Examination of murder statistics
alone may provide a faulty foundation when considering a recidivist statute, such
as Three Strikes, since many murders are committed in the heat of passion,

leaving the perpetrators unaffected by the threat of stiffer sentences. However,
composite statistics such as the violent crime rate, reflect an even more dramatic
growth rate of 18.92% from 1988 to 19922 3
Upon careful scrutiny, even the short-term statistics reveal a more ominous
scene since, although violence appears to have waned in the aggregate, the actual
local murder rates crept upward in small towns, medium-sized cities, and large
cities with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000.24 The short-term drop in

19. U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR JAN.JUNE 1993 (1993) [hereinafter FBI CRIME REPORTS]; see id at 17 (reporting a three percent national decrease,
during the period from January through June of 1993, in the reported crime index-a compilation of offenses
reported to law enforcement authorities). But see CRIME STATE RANKINGS 1994 286, 419, 420 (Kathleen
O'Leary Morgan et a]. eds., 1994) [hereinafter CRIME STATE RANKINGS] (reporting statistics calculated by the
Morgan Quitno Corporation using data from the U.S. Department of Justice, showing a 14.92% increase in the
number of murders-including nonnegligent manslaughter-from 1988 to 1992).
20. CRIME STATE RANKINGS, supranote 19, at 420.
21. Id. at 416 (depicting percentage changes in the number of violent crimes comprising the offenses
of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, including attempted rape and robbery).
22. Braun & Pasternak, supra note 16, at Al; see id. (reporting the findings of a two-day crime
conference attended by police executives which observed, in addition to increases in the overall crime rate, an
increase of 300% in the number of reported homicides and 500% in the number of reported rapes).
23. CRIE STATE RANKINGS, supranote 19, at 416-17 (reporting statistics calculated by the Morgan
Quitno Corporation using data from the U.S. Department of Justice and comprising the offenses of murder,
forcible rape, attempted rape, robbery, attempted robbery, and aggravated assault). It is important to note that
the majority of crimes go unreported to the police and that, assuming that there is no significant change in
victims' willingness to report crimes, the actual magnitude of these crime-rate increases is likely to be higher
than suggested by the data. See id. at i (reporting U.S. Department of Justice estimates that only 50% of violent
crimes were reported to the police in 1992).
24. FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 19, at 17 (listing increases in the murder rate for the first half of
1993 of one percent for cities with populations under 10,000, one percent for those with populations between
10,000 and 24,999, thirteen percent for those with populations between 25,000 and 49,999, six percent for
those with populations between 100,000 and 249,000, seven percent for those with populations between
500,000 and 999,999, and nine percent for cities outside metropolitan areas). The only population centers
showing either stasis or decrease in the number of reported murders were those with populations of over 1
million (six percent decrease), between 250,000 and 499,999 (no change), and 50,000 to 99,999 (one percent
decrease). Id.
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the murder rate seems to reflect increases almost entirely from the largest cities
with populations of over one million. Thus, public perceptions regarding crime
may find their bases more in fact than in paranoia as long-term trends and local
short-term figures depict dramatically rising crime rates in almost all population
centers.2 5
Public fears, brought about by increased violent crime, are also exacerbated
by highly-publicized accounts of violent atrocities. Indeed, a majority of Americans cite media reports, instead of personal experience or other sources, as the
foundations of their views on crime.26 The widely-reported case of Polly Klaas
is an example of a specific act of -violence that brought public antipathy for violent criminals in California and across the nation to an apex.27

In October of 1993, twelve-year-old Polly Hannah Klaas was kidnapped from
her home in Petaluma, California while her mother slept in an adjacent room?'
She was taken from her slumber party at knife-point while two of her young
friends helplessly watched.29 What followed was a highly-publicized search for
the missing girl and her kidnapper, enlisting the support of hundreds of volunteers

including actress Winona Ryder, also from Petaluma, further increasing public

awareness of the incident. 30As police and volunteers mounted one of the most intense searches in the nation's history, friends and neighbors distributed over eight
million pictures of the missing child.3 ' Finally, the young girl's body was found

in a wooded area of Sonoma County, California, and the suspect, Richard Allen

25. Notwithstanding trends, California is still regarded by some observers as one of the most dangerous
states in the nation with one study ranking it sixth most dangerous, based on fourteen negative and two positive
factors pertaining to crime rate and percentage of crimes cleared. CRIME STATE RANKINGS, supra note 19, at
ii (compiling a "most-dangerous-state" index comprising two positive factors-percentage of crimes cleared
in 1991 and percentage of violent crimes cleared in 1991- and fourteen negative factors including: (1) Crime
rate in 1992; (2) violent crime rate in 1992; (3) murder rate in 1992; (4) rape rate in 1992; (5) robbery rate in
1992; (6) aggravated assault rate in 1992; (7) property crime rate in 1992; (8) percent change in crime rate from
1988 to 1992; (9) percent change in violent crime rate from 1988 to 1992; (10) state prisoner incarceration rate
in 1992; (11) reported arrests of youths 17 years and younger as a percentage of all arrests in 1992; (12)
reported arrests of youths 17 years and younger for violent crime as a percentage of all such arrests in 1992;
(13) state and local government expenditures for police protection as a percentage of all direct expenditures
in 1991; and (14) full-time sworn officers in law enforcement agencies per 10,000 people in 1992).
26. Braun & Pasternak, supra note 16, at Al; see id. (summarizing the results of a Los Angeles Times
poll showing that 65% of those surveyed indicated the media (electronic and printed) as the source of their
attitudes toward crime, 21% cited their own personal experiences or those of friends and family, 13% relied
on both equally, and 1%relied on neither).
27. See Initiative or No Initiative, "Three Strikes" Is the Law in California, CAL. J. WKLY., Mar. 14,
1994, at I (citing the murder of Kimber Reynolds by a paroled felon and, in particular, the kidnapping and
murder of Polly Klaas by a repeat felon, as examples of cases providing impetus for the passage of Three
Strikes); infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Polly Klaas incident and its effect on antirecidivist sentiment).
28. Richard C. Paddock, All-Out Searchfor Missing Girl,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at A3.
29. Peter Fimrite, 600 Searchfor Kidnapped Girl; PetalumaPolice Say They Have No Substantive
Leads, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1993, at A17.
30. Jim H. Zamora, Winona Ryder Offers Reward in Kidnap Case;Actress Feels a Kinship with Polly
Klaas-BothHailfrom Petaluma,S.F. EXAM., Oct. 11, 1993, at A4.
31. John Flinn, 1993 Crimes, S.F. EXAM., Dec. 27, 1993, at A8.
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Davis, apprehended. 2 Overnight, the search was transformed into a vigil of grief,
as mourners held candles outside search headquarters and television carried the

image throughout the nation.3 3 Grief quickly became outrage when it was disclosed that Davis had spent most of his adult life in prison for violent crimes,
including two kidnapping convictions, and that police had actually held the killer
in custody while Polly Klaas was still alive and hidden on a nearby embankment.34 Thus was born a popular movement, spearheaded by the victim's father,
Marc Klaas, and the Polly Klaas Foundation, that ignited a stepped-up campaign
for stricter treatment of repeat offenders in the forum of public opinion as well as
in the State Legislature?'
Growing anti-crime fervor, elevated by the high-profile Klaas incident and
other similar crimes, 36 soon led to intense pressure on state legislators to offer
some form of anti-recidivist legislation.3 7 Although other alternatives to Three
Strikes had failed to muster enough support for passage in the California Legislature, 38 AB 971, the strictest of the three strikes bills, was quickly ushered to the
Governor's desk for signing. 9 Indeed, most of the debate concerning the parti
32. Eric Brazil, Polly FoundDead; Body of 12-Year-Old Discoverednear Cloverdale,S.F. EXAM., Dec.
5, 1993, at Al.
33. Nancy Vogel, Fury, GriefTake Over in Petaluma,SACRAMENTo BEE, Dec. 6, 1993, at Al.
34. See Michael Otten, CaliforniaGovernor Calls Crime CrackdownSession, REUTERS, Dec. 29, 1993,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (reporting facts surrounding the discovery of the body of Polly
Klaas and the apprehension of Richard Allen Davis, the man accused of kidnapping and murdering Klaas);
George Raine, Prison Work Plan a "Sham;'"Incentive Programthat Let KlaasSuspect out EarlySlammed
by Critics, S.F. EXAM., Dec. 12, 1993, at Al (discussing the outrage many felt toward the work incentive
program that allowed Richard Allen Davis to reduce his prison term from 16 to 8 years); Seth Rosenfeld, Davis
Admits Killing Polly; Suspect Says He Strangled,Buried Her and Acted Alone; Reportedly She Was Alive and
Hidden Nearby as Deputies Grilled Suspect on Night of Kidnapping, S.F. EXAM., Dec. 6, 1993, at Al

(reporting that Polly Klaas was alive and hidden on a nearby embankment while Richard Allen Davis was

being questioned for nighttime prowling by Sonoma County Sheriffs Deputies).
35. Larry King, Abduction and Murder-The Polly Klaas Tragedy, LARRY KING LIvE, Dec. 14, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Klaas described the mission of the Foundation as "making
America safe for children" and outlined a three-point plan that included: (1) Educating the public and children
about the dangers that confront the children; (2) establishing methods for helping other parents to deal with
kidnapping situations; and (3) supporting anti-recidivist legislation such as Three Strikes. Id. Although Klaas
described a law with features like those of AB 971 and Proposition 184, such as a possible life sentence for
third serious felony convictions, he later opposed Three Strikes, arguing that the nonviolent third strike
provision could unfairly require life sentences for perpetrators of relatively innocuous third felonies. Id.; see
infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Marc Klaas' opposition of AB 971 and Proposition 184 due
to the fact that both laws included nonviolent third felonies).
36. See, e.g., Jill Smolowe, Dangerin the Safety Zone; As Violence Spreads into Small Towns, Many
Americans BarricadeThemselves, TnME, Aug. 23, 1993, at 28 (recounting an array of highly visible crimes
committed in places traditionally believed to be safe havens, such as homes, hospitals, and courtrooms).
37. See Jerry Gillam, LegislatorsFearPublic on "Three Strikes," Brown Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1994, at A3 (describing the pressure bearing upon California legislators to pass tougher habitual offender laws).
38. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to Three Strikes, as legislated
in AB 971).
39. Richardson, supra note 5, at Al; see id. (describing AB 971's trip through the State Senate as
proceeding "like few measures in recent history, without a single change, a rarity in an institution that
commonly tinkers with every measure before it"). Governor Pete Wilson quickly signed the bill into law amidst
highly-publicized fanfare, receiving the bill on Thursday, March 3, 1994 and signing it into law only four days
later on Monday, March 7, 1994. Id.; 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 12, sec. 1, at 56 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE
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culars of Three Strikes was waged outside of the Legislature since both Demo-

crats and Republicans supported the bill, stating that they were merely responding

to the desires of their constituents.' ° Even legislators professing disapproval of
Three Strikes vowed support in the name of representative democracy.4 1

After the furor surrounding the Polly Klaas incident, the young victim's name
soon found its way into the rhetoric of state politicians seeking popular mandates
for their own versions of anti-recidivist legislation. 42AB 167, AB 1568, AB 2429,
ABX 9, and SB 864 were examples of some of the Legislature's most ardent3
efforts to provide an alternative to the three strikes provisions of AB 971 !

Assemblymember Tom Umberg (D-Garden Grove) authored AB 167, which contained repeat offender provisions targeted primarily at violent second offenders

with prior violent felony convictions.4 Assemblymember Richard Rainey (RWalnut Creek) proposed AB 1568, with less-severe ten-year sentence enhancements for second-time violent offenders. 45 AB 2429 and its sibling ABX 9, both
authored by Assemblymember Ross Johnson (R-Placentia) represented one of the
most narrowly crafted bills, designed to target only the most violent of repeat
felony offenders. 46 Senator Quentin Kopp's (I-San Francisco) SB 864 was similar

§ 667.5); see Initiativeor No Initiative, "Three Strikes" Is the Law in California,supra note 27, at 1 (reporting
that AB 971 was passed by the State Legislature on March 3 and signed along with a statement by the
Governor on the morning of March 7 as the press looked on).
40. See Gillam, supra note 37, at A3 (quoting Assembly Speaker Willie Brown's remark that Three

Strikes was passed without rational dialogue as the Legislature bowed to public pressure); see also James
Richardson, "Three Strikes" Sent Roaring into Senate, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 1, 1994, at Al (recounting
Senate debate where legislators cited the desires of constituents who wanted "safer neighborhoods and
criminals locked up for life").
41. Richardson, supra note 5, at Al; see id. (quoting a statement by State Senator Leroy Greene (D.
Carmichael) that he would "vote for these turkeys [AB 971 and other crime bills] because that's what our
constituents want .... ").
42. See ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS CoMMIrrrEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 971, at 2 (Jan. 26,
1994) (listing four bills proffered as alternatives to the provisions of Three Strikes as proposed in AB 971 by
Assemblymembers Bill Jones and Jim Costa: AB 167, authored by Assemblymember Tom Umberg; AB 1568,
authored by Assemblymember Richard Rainey; and AB 2429/ABX 9, authored by Assemblymember Ross
Johnson).
43. AB 167, 1993-1994 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mar. 2, 1994); AB 1568, 1993-1994 Calif. Leg. Reg.
Sess. (Mar. 2, 1994); AB 2429, 1993-1994 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mar. 2, 1994); ABX 9, 1993-1994 Calif.
Leg. Spec. Sess. A (Mar. 2, 1994); SB 864, 1993-1994 Calif. Leg. Reg. Sess. (June 16, 1994).
44. See SENATE ComMITTm
EE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMrrrEI ANALYSIS OF AB 167, at 2 (Feb. 28,
1994) (providing an alternative to the sentencing provisions proposed in AB 971 with different term
enhancements for felons depending on whether the prior felonies were violent, serious, or both).
45. See SENATE RULES CoMMrEE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1568, at I (Mar. 3, 1994) (providing
for a fixed ten-year enhancement for each prior violent felony rather than the doubling or tripling provisions
of Chapter 12); id. at 1, 3-7 (providing additions to the lists of serious or violent felonies found in California
Penal Code §§ 1192.7(c) and 667.5(c)(1)-(17), respectively).
46. See SENATEFLOOR,COMMrrrEEANALYSISOFAB2429,at 1-2 (Mar. 3,1994) (containing provisions
similar to those found in AB 1568, but applying only to third or more repeat felony convictions and
additionally providing for the development of an anti-recidivism plan for inmates under the age of 25 who are
serving sentences for first-time felony convictions); see also SENATE COMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra
note 44, at 2 (describing ABX 9 as similar to AB 2429 and outlining its features, including the absence of
sentence enhancements for second felony offenders and the omission of "serious" felonies as a sentenceenhancement trigger).
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to AB 1568, but only contained sentence enhancements of fifteen years to life for
rapists, twenty-five years to life for child molesters, and life without possibility
of parole for third-time violent felons.4 7 In stark contrast with the support resulting in passage of AB 971, each alternative measure failed, sometimes miser8
ably, with one bill actually receiving only one vote in its first hearing.!
The subject of this Note, AB 971, authored by Assemblymembers Bill Jones
(R-Fresno) and Jim Costa (D-Fresno), was quickly passed by the Legislature,
carried with bipartisan support that found its impetus in public opinion.49 Cali-

fornia Governor Pete Wilson invoked the Klaas incident as he convened a special
session of the State Legislature for the purpose of considering AB 971 and other
crime bills5o that would, upon passage, go into effect immediately, rather than on
January 1, 1995 with the rest of the legislative session's business. 5'
Even during the 1994 gubernatorial election, front runners Kathleen Brown
(Democrat) and Pete Wilson (Republican) each sought to harness the power of
public support for three strikes laws and, particularly, Proposition 184, the socalled "Three Strikes and You're Out" initiative, by voicing their support for
these measures.52 Brown, despite what opponents had characterized as a permissive stance on crime, firmly embraced the initiative and, when asked about its
estimated $17 billion cost, replied that the State must "do what it takes" to ensure
public safety.53 Likewise, Wilson was often quick to take credit for signing AB
971 and for supporting the Three Strikes initiative that, prior to its passage, enjoyed an eighty percent approval rating.' 4 Support or opposition to three strikes
laws became a benchmark for evaluating candidates in the 1994 state elections.
Thus, swelling anti-crime emotions, brought to a crescendo by tragedies such
as the one that took the life of Polly Klaas, inspired Three Strikes and other bills

47. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYsIS OF SB 864, at 3 (June 21,
1994) (providing that a third strike resulting in life imprisonment without parole will only occur where a violent
felony has been committed).
48. Debra I. Saunders. What Are They Fighting Over?, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 1994, at A21; see id.
(reporting a vote tally of one before the Assembly Public Safety Committee in favor of SB 864 which would
have reserved life sentences for third-time violent felons).
49. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. AB 971 was introduced on March 1, 1993, and
enrolled on March 3, 1994.
50. See, e.g., Richardson, supranote 40, at Al (summarizing Three Strikes and other crime bills such
as AB 87 by Assemblymember Mickey Conroy (R-Orange) that would have appropriated $175,000 for a
feasibility study on deportation of inmates who are illegal immigrants to their native countries to finish their

sentences; AB 560 by Assemblymember Robert Epple (D-Cerritos) that would have allowed children 14 and

older to be tried as adults for murder; AB 645 by Assemblymember Doris Allen (R-Cypress) that would have
increased maximum sentences for those caught carrying or using firearms on school grounds; and AB 2261
by Assemblymember Tom Connolly (D-Lemon Grove) that would have increased the maximum length of
prison sentences for kidnapping from 8 years to a range between 11 and 13 years).
51. Otten, supranote 34.
52. A Voters' Guide to the Top Races in Californiaand the Sacramento Area, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
23, 1994, Election '94, at 2-3.
53. Id. Election '94, at 3.
54. State Propositions,supra note 5, at A3. See supranote 39 and accompanying text (noting the haste
and publicity surrounding Governor Wilson's signing of AB 971).
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that began to appear in the State Senate and Assembly to address a perceived revolving door through which felons repeatedly entered, exited, and then re-entered
the state prison system. 5 Part III will specifically discuss the workings of Three
Strikes as enacted by AB 971 and its proposed methods of addressing the State's
revolving-door prison system.
III. PENAL CODE SECTION

667: THE ELEMENTS OF THREE STRIKES

A. The Statute
Enhanced sentencing schemes for repeat offenders are not new to California's
statute books that have, since June 8, 1982, contained Penal Code section 667, the
Career Criminal Punishment Act.56 This section enacted into law a provision that
one who is presently convicted of a serious felony57 and who has been previously
convicted of a serious felony in California or an equivalent felony" in another
state receives, in addition to the sentence for the present felony, a five-year sentence enhancement for each prior felony conviction on charges separately brought
and tried.59 Thus, California joined nearly thirty other states, including Illinois,
Michigan, New York, and Texas, in enacting sentence enhancements for
recidivists.60
Section 667, after the enactment of AB 971, augments these sentence enhancements by providing for increased terms of imprisonment for felons convicted of second and third offenses. 6' Under the amended version of section 667,

55.

Enacts Enhancementsfor Prior
Recent Legislation: CriminalProcedure-Sentencing-California

Felony Convictions, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2123 (1994) (describing passage of AB 971 as the California
Legislature's response to public pressure for a solution to the penal system's tendency to release violent and
dangerous career criminals). See generallyMark W. Owens, Review of Selected 1994 Legislation, 26 PAc. LJ.

202, 442-46 (1995) (discussing the features, foundations, and ramifications of AB 971).
56. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 1043, sec. 1,at 3619 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 667).
57. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "felony," for the purposes of this
section, as a serious felony as defined in California Penal Code § 1192.7); see also id. § 1192.7(c)(l)-(28)

(West Supp. 1995) (defining a serious felony as any of several enumerated offenses including violent crimes,
drug-related offenses, and conspiracies to commit such offenses). However, § 667 excludes from the definition
of serious felony, convictions for selling or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any
methamphetamine-related drug or any precursors of methamphetamine unless the prior conviction was for a
serious felony described in California Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(24). Id. § 667(a)(5) (West Supp. 1995); see infra
note 62 (listing the offenses defined as serious for the purposes of Three Strikes).
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (defining a prior felony conviction, in part,
as a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed in California, would be punishable by
imprisonment in state prison or conviction in anotherjurisdiction for an offense that includes all of the elements
of a serious felony as listed in California Penal Code § 1192.7(c)); infra note 62 (setting forth the provisions
of California Penal Code § 1192.7(c)).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 667(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
60. See infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text (discussing three strikes legislation in other states).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1995).
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defendants with one prior serious 62 or violent63 felony conviction must receive
twice the term that they would otherwise receive for the current conviction.'
Defendants with two or more prior convictions shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment for life with a minimum term of the greatest of three

options: Three times the term otherwise provided for the current felony, twentyfive years of imprisonment in state prison, or the term for the underlying con-

62. See id. § 1192.7(c)(l)-(28) (West Supp. 1995) (defining a "serious" felony as any of the following
enumerated offenses: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter;, (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
victim or another person; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury; (6) lewd acts on a child under 14; (7) any felony punishable by death or life imprisonment in the state prison; (8) any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury or uses a firearm; (9)
attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument on a peace officer;, (12) assault by a life prisoner on a non-inmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon
by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury; (17) exploding a destructive device
or any explosive with intent to murder; (18) burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach, or inhabited portion of any other building; (19) robbery or bank robbery;, (20) kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage
by a person confined in state prison; (22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment;
(23) any felony where the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling, furnishing,
administering, giving, or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give heroin, cocaine, PCP, a methamphetamine-related drug, or a precursor of methamphetamine to a minor; (25) any penetration with a foreign
object, under California Penal Code § 289(a), accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (26) grand theft
involving a firearm; (27) carjacking; and (28) any attempt to commit one or more of the crimes enumerated
in this section).
63. See id. § 667.5(c)(l)-(17) (West Supp. 1995) (listing felonies defined by statute to constitute
"violent" felonies, including: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter, (2) mayhem; (3) rape in violation of Penal
Code § 261(2); (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury;
(6) lewd acts on a child under 14 in violation of Penal Code § 288; (7) any felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment in the state prison; (8) any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury (except on
an accomplice) pursuant to Penal Code § 12022.7 or § 12022.9 or uses a firearm pursuant to Penal Code
§ 12022.5 or 12022.55; (9) any robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, vessel that is inhabited and
designed for habitation, inhabited floating home, inhabited trailer coach, or the inhabited portion of any other
building, using a deadly or dangerous weapon; (10) arson in violation of Penal Code § 451; (11) rape by force,
violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury; (12) attempted murder;, (13)
explosion with intent to murder in violation of Penal Code § 12308; (14) kidnapping in violation of Penal Code
§ 207(b); (15) kidnapping as punished in Penal Code § 208(b); (16) continuous sexual abuse of a child in
violation of Penal Code § 288.5; and (17) carjacking where the defendant personally used a dangerous or

deadly weapon as provided in Penal Code § 12022).
64. Id. § 667(e)(1) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (requiring double prison terms for determinate sentences
and twice the minimum term for indeterminate sentences); see also id. § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995)
(establishing sentences of definite duration in order to provide for uniformity of sentencing); E. Barrett
Prettyman, The IndeterminateSentence and the Right to Treatment, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 7, 13 n.27 (1972)
(discussing the definition of indeterminate sentencing and providing a comparison with the notion of indefinite
sentencing). An indeterminate sentence is one in which there is no maximum term and the reviewing authority
has complete discretion to release the inmate at any time, with or without conditions, or to keep him or her
incarcerated for life. Id. An indefinite sentence may involve a minimum period of incarceration, but there is
nevertheless a legislatively orjudicially set maximum beyond which the inmate cannot be kept. Id. The indefiniteness of the sentence arises from the power of the reviewing authority to release the inmate prior to the
expiration of his or her maximum term. Id. See generally Alan Dershowitz, IndeterminateConfinement: Letting
the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 304-15 (1974) (examining the history of indeterminate
sentencing).
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viction including applicable enhancements.' The application of Three Strikes

may be illustrated by a hypothetical court applying the law to a defendant with
two prior serious or violent felony convictions-one for armed assault on a peace
officero and one for burglary of a residence 6 7-- facing a current charge of burg-

lary. Under prior law, assuming that the defendant had earned the maximum number of allowable credits for participation in work or education programs, a typical

sentence would be seven years in state prison.68 Under Three Strikes, the greatest
of the three sentencing options would be twenty-five years, since three times the
term otherwise provided would result in a twenty-one-year sentence, and the term

for the underlying conviction, including enhancements, would be seven years.69
Three Strikes ostensibly proscribes the use of prior felony convictions in plea
bargaining," thus requiring the prosecution to plead and prove all prior felony
convictions without entering into agreements to strike or dismiss any of them.71
However, prosecuting attorneys have the latitude under Three Strikes to dismiss
2
or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice

65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 667(e)(2)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1995)
(proscribing the use of determinate sentences or enhancements found in California Penal Code § 1170 as a
source for one of the options); id. § 1170 (West Supp. 1995) (establishing determinate sentences to be used
in the absence of mitigating circumstances); see also id. § 667(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1,995) (providing that
indeterminate sentences imposed under § 667(e)(2)(A) are to be served consecutively with any other term
which may be accompanied by a consecutive sentence).
66. Id. §§ 240-241 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (defining the crime of assault on a peace officer and
establishing the penalty of six months in the county jail or one year or less if the assault was committed against
the officer while in the performance of his or her duties).
67. Id. §§ 459-461 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); see id. (defining the crime of burglary of an inhabited
dwelling house and setting forth a punishment of two, four, or six years imprisonment).
68. See Debate, supranote 10 (discussing sentencing variations under Tharee Strikes and prior law). This
sentence may be calculated by adding two five-year sentence enhancements to the middle sentence of four
years for first-degree burglary and subtracting 50%, the maximum allowable credit under prior law.
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 1995) (providing for a minimum term
of the greater of three options which, here, would provide a choice between 25 years, 3 times 7 years or 21
years, or the underlying sentence of 7 years).
70. See id. § 1192.7(b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining plea bargaining as any bargaining, negotiation, or
discussion between a criminal defendant (or his or her attorney) and the prosecuting attorney or judge wherein
the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere in exchange for promises, commitments, concessions,
assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge regarding charging or sentencing).
71. Id. § 667(g) (West Supp. 1995).
72. Id. § 667(0(2) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 1385(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that a judge or
magistrate may, in the furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed upon his or her own motion, or
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney); see also Interview with John W. McTigue, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Contra Costa County, Oct. 12, 1994 (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal)(opining
that prosecutors will frequently dismiss or strike prior felony convictions where they believe the particular
felon to be too benign to justify the expense of public funds that could be used to prosecute more nefarious
offenders); Peter Hecht, How "Three Strikes" Law Is Used Across the State; ProsecutorsExercise Differing
Degrees of Discretion in Charging Those Liable for Long Sentences, S.F. EXAM., Aug. 8, 1994, at A7
[hereinafter How "Three Strikes" Law Is Used] (citing district attorneys' fears of soaring prosecution costs as

motivating decisions not to prosecute minor third felonies). Those opposing Three

Strikes'

furtherance-of-

justice feature have criticized the granting of such discretion to prosecutors with one hand while removing it
from judges with the other. See iL Even some prosecutors have criticized this feature which, they argue, results
in the law's uneven application throughout the state, with felons in some counties receiving life sentences for
the same offenses that result in short sentences in other counties. See id.; see also Peter Hecht, CaseMerits
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Additionally, since Three Strikes is silent with respect to offenses committed

while on parole, prosecutors may avoid treating current offenses as "strikes" by

processing them as administrative parole violations. 73
With respect to prior convictions, Three Strikes defines a prior felony as a
"strike" regardless of whether a sentence was actually served. Therefore, it makes
no difference whether the prior felony resulted in a suspended sentence, stay of
execution of sentence, commitment to the State Department of Health Services,
or commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center or other rehabilitative
institution. 74
Three Strikes also prohibits or limits several means of diverting convicted
felons around the prison system or limiting their stay in prison. Probation or suspended sentences for felons who have committed one or more prior serious or
violent felony are prohibited.!' Diversion to any facility other than the state prison, including the California Rehabilitation Center, is also prohibited.76 The total
duration of term credits?7 awarded under the Penal Code may not exceed one-fifth
of the total sentence, and will not begin to accrue until the defendant is physically
placed in the state prison. 78 Three Strikes prohibits felons from serving concurrent
terms and instead requires consecutive sentencing for multiple felonies not
committed on the same occasion.79 Finally, the amount of time that has elapsed
between the current felony conviction and the prior felony conviction is irrelevant
for the purpose of sentencing under Three Strikes.80
Three Strikes eliminates several practices whereby sentence terms are reduced or tempered. The court must adhere to certain enumerated prohibitions including those related to aggregate term limitations. 81 Specifically, where the ag-

"Three Strikes?" Depends on the DA, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 7, 1994, at Al (quoting a statement by San
Mateo County District Attorney James Fox that Three Strikes allows for considerable inequality of punishment
from county to county). The decisions of district attorneys to seek a Three Strikes sentence is difficult and
complex and frequently involves a balancing of notions of fairness and political considerations. How "Three

Strikes" Law Is Used, supra, at A7 (quoting a statement by Professor J. Clark Kelso of McGeorge School of

Law regarding the issues created by Three Strikes).
73.

See Claire Spiegel, "Three Strikes" Loophole Can Give Offenders a Break, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 24,

1994, at Al (listing several instances where California prosecutors have routed third-strike offenders around
the provisions of Three Strikes by processing offenses as administrative parole violations).

74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
75. Id. §667(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
76. Id. § 667(c)(4) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (providing that the defendant shall not be eligible for
commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center as would normally be available under Article 2 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code (commencing with § 3050)).
77. See id. §§ 2930-2932 (West Supp. 1995) (containing provisions for credit on terms of imprisonment).
78. Id. §667(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995).
79. Id. § 667(c)(6)-(8) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (providing that multiple current convictions, not
arising from the same set of operative facts, must result in consecutively-served sentences, and sentences for
current convictions must also be served consecutively with any other sentences already being served).
80. Id. § 667(c)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
81. See id. § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1995) (providing for the calculation of aggregate and consecutive
terms of imprisonment for multiple convictions imposed under California Penal Code §§ 669 and 1170).
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gregate term of imprisonment would normally be limited by prior law, Three
Strikes provides that no such limit will apply with regard to consecutive sen-

tencing of felons with one or more prior serious or violent felony convictions. 82
Thus, under Three Strikes, the five-year sentence cap for nonviolent felons no
longer applies to affected offenders and, likewise, the limit for non-serious
felonies-twice the number of years imposed as the base term-also becomes
redundant. 3
Juvenile adjudications also count as prior convictions for the purposes of
Three Strikes. If the juvenile was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time he or
she committed the prior serious or violent offense, was found to be subject to
treatment under juvenile law, and was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court,
Three Strikes will consider the prior offense as a "strike" for sentencing purposes.'
Proposition 184, the Three Strikes ballot initiative, essentially a duplicate of
AB 971, enacted California Penal Code section 1170.12 to reflect changes to
Penal Code section 667 enacted by AB 971.85 However, Proposition 184 is not
a tautology since, unlike legislative amendments that may be modified or repealed
by a majority vote of the Legislature, additions or changes to California law
brought about through the initiative process may only be modified or repealed by
a two-thirds vote in the Legislature or by a subsequent ballot initiative.86 Thus,
passage of Proposition 184, in November of 1994, protects Three Strikes from
direct legislative tampering, at least until the next general election.
B. JudicialBacklash to Three Strikes
Prior to the passage of AB 971, efforts were made, both in the Legislature
and in the courts, to dilute the impact of Three Strikes. Consideration of Three
Strikes in the Legislature sparked the introduction of several alternative bills, all
of which failed to garner the support that ultimately led to the success of Three

82. Id. § 667(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
83. Id. § 1170.1(a) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (imposing a 5-year maximum on sentences not defined
as violent felonies under California Penal Code § 667.5); id. § 1170.1(g)(1)-(2) (providing that the sentence
limit shall be twice the number of years imposed by the trial court as the base term under California Penal Code
§ 1170 for felonies that are not: (1) Defined as violent under § 667.5; (2) imposed consecutively under
§ 1170.1, subsections (b) or (c); (3) imposed as enhancements under specifically enumerated code sections;
or (4) defined as serious under § 1192.7).
84. Id. § 667(d)(3) (West Supp. 1995).
85. See id.§ 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995) (containing almost identical provisions to those found in Penal
Code section 667(c)-(j) as amended by AB 971); Legislative Analyst's Analysis of Proposition184, Nov. 8,
1994 California General Election (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal)(describing the provisions of
Proposition 184 as identical to those of AB 971); cf. infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (analyzing an
apparent difference between the provisions of AB 971 and Proposition 184).
86. CAL. CONST. art. 11,§ 8; id. art. XVIII, § 2; id. art. XVIII, § 3.
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Strikes.87 But, after passage of AB 971 and Proposition 184, the battle moved
from the Legislature to the courts, where some judges have taken issue with
Three Strikes' removal of judicial sentencing discretion while others have simply
refused to uphold a law that they believe to be unjust. 88
The debate over Proposition 184, having simmered in the form of legislative
Three Strikes arguments since the introduction of AB 971 and other bills, had lost
much of its fuel in the months prior to the November elections of 1994.9 Public
attention seemed to have been diverted toward more closely contested initiatives,
such as the controversial Proposition 187, 90 instead of toward one that was pre-

dicted to pass by an eighty percent margin and which functioned more as a message from the voters than as new law. 91Thus, following enactment of AB 971 and

Proposition 184, the battle moved from the forum of public debate to the courtroom with some recalcitrant jurists vowing to ignore Three Strikes' popular mandate by refusing to follow its dictates. A Los Angeles Times study showed that,
in Los Angeles County, only one in six defendants eligible for Three Strikes

received the twenty-five years to life sentence required by law.92 Although the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion has accounted for some of the softening of
Three Strikes, many weakening blows have come from judges acting on their
own to reduce penalties. 93

87. See Brad Hayward, PanelRejects Alternate "Three Strikes" Proposal,SACRAMENTO BEE, June 22,
1994, at A3 (describing efforts to pass alternative legislation, such as State Senator Quentin Kopp's SB 864,
in the shadow of the Legislature's consideration of AB 971).
88. See Richard Lee Colvin & Ted Rohrlich, CourtsToss Curveballs to "3 Strikes," L.A. TI ,s, Oct.
23, 1994, at AI (reporting that judges and prosecutors have diluted the effect of Three Strikes through judicial
refusal to hand down prescribed sentences and through prosecutors' unwillingness to demand sentence
enhancements under certain circumstances).
89. See John Borland, The Initiative War, CAL. J. WKLY., Oct. 24, 1994, at 1 (observing that, despite
its ostentatious beginning, the Three Strikes debate had dwindled to a "whimper" by November).
90. See Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and Reporting. Initiative Statute,
Proposition 187 (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215, 66010.8; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65; CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114, 834b; and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 10001.5) (making illegal aliens ineligible for certain public services, requiring various state and local
agencies to report illegal aliens, and making it a felony to manufacture, distribute, sell, or use false citizenship
or residence documents); see also K.L. Billingsley, Wilson Wins CaliforniaRace Dominatedby Immigration;
Huffington has Lead for Senate, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A13 (referring to Proposition 187 as a
controversial measure that led by a narrow margin in the last week prior to the election).
91. George Skelton, Sending a Message with Initiative, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1994, at A3; see id.
(referring to Proposition 184 as a "less controversial" message initiative designed to "tell opposition leaders
to go jump off a long pier.... ."); see also State Propositions,supranote 5, at A3 (reporting the final vote for
Proposition 184 at 72%). Thus Proposition 184 passed by less than the predicted 80%, but still by a
significantly higher margin than that most of the other proposition on the November ballot. See State
Propositions,S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at B4 (reporting passage rates of 67% for Proposition 183, 59% for
Proposition 187, 79% for Proposition 189, 64% for Proposition 190, and 61% for Proposition 191).
92. Colvin & Rohrlich, supra note 88, at Al (summarizing a review of all 98 third-strike cases
adjudicated between enactment of AB 971 in March, 1994 and August 31, 1994).

93. Id.at Al (finding that, of the Three Strikes

cases decided during the survey period, 25 reduced

sentences were handed down as a result of mitigating action by district attorneys, while 27 resulted from
judicial action).
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The ability of judges to ignore sentencing requirements under Three Strikes
stems from three sources: power under pre-existing law allowing judges to ignore
past strikes, authority to reduce certain felonies to misdemeanors punishable by
no more than one year in jail, and simple refusal to abide by what defecting
judges believe to be an unjust law. 94 One recent example of a judge choosing that
third of these options involved a case in which a Contra Costa County Superior
Court Judge refused to hand down a twenty-five years to life sentence for a third
strike, ruling that judges have broad discretion when applying Three Strikes?'
This case involved Clarence Malbrough, a third-time felon who had spent most
of his forty-seven years in prison and, on his third strike, was tried for the theft
of batteries, with a value of eighty dollars, from an El Cerrito store. 96 Rather than
sentencing Malbrough to life in prison for a third felony under Three Strikes,
Judge Richard Arnason chose to reduce the crime from a felony to a misde-

meanor, sentencing Malbrough to one year injail.97 Although purportedly acting
in the interests of justice, judges such as Arnason sometimes choose to ignore
what appears to be the express provisions of the law, placing felons back on the
streets. It should be noted that Malbrough, although most recently convicted of
theft, had a history of eleven felony convictions, eleven misdemeanor convictions, and had spent thirty-two years entering and re-entering the prison
system-the epitome of the criminal targeted by Three Strikes.98
Although Proposition 184 and AB 971 appear identical and are generally
reported to be functionally redundant, there is one difference that has begun to
provide fuel for arguments that judges have discretion to strike prior convictions.
California Penal Code section 667, as amended by AB 971, contains language
referring to California Penal Code section 1385 that expressly refuses to authorize
judges to strike prior convictions of serious felonies used for the purpose of enhancement under section 667. 99 In contrast, California Penal Code section
1170.12, added by Proposition 184, is silent regarding section 1385 as well as the
five-year sentence enhancement which provided its context in section 667. Thus,
thorough defense attorneys will most likely argue that, since courts must construe
statutes harmoniously whenever possible to avoid "absurd and anomalous results," the apparent conflict between AB 971 and Proposition 184 should be

94. See id. at AI (reporting claims by judges that pre-existing law allows them to ignore prior strikes
or reduce the current felony to a misdemeanor).
95. Larry D. Hatfield, ProsecutorDecries "Three Strikes" Ruling, S.F. EXAM., Dec. 23, 1994, at A6.
96. Jd. at A6.
97. lML; see id. (describing Judge Amason's reduction of a third-strike sentence through the use of a socalled "wobbler" or crime chargeable as either a misdemeanor or a felony under the Penal Code).
98. See id (describing Malbrough's prior convictions).
99. See CAL PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the 5-year sentence
enhancements authorized by existing law be imposed in compliance with California Penal Code § 1385(b));

see also id § 1385(b) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the provisions of § 1385 relating to the striking of prior

convictions by the judge or magistrate inthe furtherance of justice, do not authorize ajudge to strike prior
convictions for serious felonies used for sentence enhancement under California Penal Code § 667).

896
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resolved in favor of the latter, which was more recently enacted.t

°

It might

further be assumed that, the omission of this clause in Proposition 184, where it
was present in prior law, betrays a legislative intent that the provisions of section
1385 should not be incorporated by section 1170.12.101
Nevertheless, the fact remains that general rules of statutory construction
require not only that reference be made to the plain language of the statute, but
also that the intent of the enacting body be given "paramount consideration. ' 2
Therefore, although both arguments are compelling, it will be difficult, given the
significant amount of published material relating to the legislative intent behind
Three Strikes, to argue that the Legislature intended to allow judicial discretion
in Proposition 184 where such was denied by AB 971 and where no mention is
made in section 1385 to section 1170.12, enacted by Proposition 184.103
Prior to publication of this Note, the California Court of Appeal had decided
only one case, People v. Romero, 104 addressing the aforementioned issues of statutory interpretation. That case held that legislative intent must prevail over the
letter of the law which, in turn, should be construed in conformity with the spirit

of the act.'0 5 The Court of Appeal found that, although the language of Proposition 184 did not specifically refer to the court's authority to strike in the
interest of justice pursuant to California Penal Code section 1385, the stated intent
of the Legislature was to "ensure 'longer prison sentences and greater punish-

ment' for recidivist felony defendants who had previously been convicted of
serious and/or violent crimes. ' 't °6 An additional argument asserts that the

separation of powers doctrine requires that judges be permitted to strike prior

100. See People v. Gonzales, 51 Cal.3d 1179,1221,800 P.2d 1159,1179,275 Cal. Rptr. 729,749 (1990)
(holding that "[wihenever possible, courts must construe statutes harmoniously and to avoid absurd or
anomalous results").
101. See Ultramar, Inc. v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 17 Cal. App. 4th 689,699,21 Cal. Rptr.
2d 608, 612 (1993) (espousing the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
meaning that expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not
expressed); see also Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal.3d 727,735,755 P.2d 299,304,248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120
(1988) (holding that "[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to
conform to the spirit of the act").
102. See Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 514 P.2d 1224, 1229,
110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1973) (holding that a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that the intent
of the Legislature be obtained from "every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose"); see also In re Lance W., 37 Cal.3d 873, 889,694 P.2d 744,754,210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 641
(1985) (holding that "[i]n construing... statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by
initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration').
103. See People v. Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 370 (1995) (observing that "[a] perceived failure of
the criminal justice system to deal effectively with recidivism is evident from the initiative proponents'
arguments which refer to the 'judicial system's revolving door' and 'soft-on-crimejudges, politicians, defense
lawyers and probation officers"'(citations omitted)).
104. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1995).
105. Id. at 375.
106. Id. at 375; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(h) (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the legislative purpose
behind Three Strikes in language identical to that found in the ballot pamphlet preamble of Proposition 184);
see also Califomia Ballot Pamphlet, Nov. 8, 1994 California General Election, at 64 (copy on file with the
Paciflc Law Journal) (stating the legislative intent behind Proposition 184).
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offenses on their own volition and not only on the prosecutor's motion.0 7 However, this argument was rejected by Romero which held that Three Strikes constrains rather than augments prosecutorial discretion and dobs not further remove
any power from the court which is delimited by California Penal Code section
1385 and not section 667.8
Appellate judges have occasionally refused to follow Three Strikes for no
other reason than because their consciences have so dictated. However, such
refusals have, so far, come in the form of denials of writs of mandate, without the
force of precedent."° One such case involving a refusal to overturn a Sonoma
County Judge's grant of probation in contravention of Three Strikes drew a
copious dissent from Justice Paul Hearle of the First District Court of Appeal that
may ultimately carry more precedential value than the unpublished opinion of the

majority."t0

C. Other Three Strikes Laws
California's AB 971 and Proposition 184 are regarded as the toughest

versions of three strikes legislation in the country."' Still, the growing national
preoccupation with crime has resulted in efforts by state governments across the

nation to enact their own brands of repeat-offender statutes. Sixteen states are

currently considering permutations of Three Strikes, while several
besides Calit2
fornia have already enacted recidivist statutes of their own."
Two such statutes, ranked on a level with California's Three Strikes in terms

of strictness, are Washington's repeat offender statute and Texas' recidivist
statute, both of which are similar to and predate California's three strikes law.
Enacted in November of 1993 as the Persistent Offender Accountability Act,

Washington's law provides for mandatory life sentences without possibility of

107. Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
108. Id. at 373-74.
109. See, e.g., Philip Carrizosa, "Three Strikes" Is Loser, and Convict Gets Probation,S.F. DAILY J.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 1 (citing the unpublished order in People v. Sup. Ct., A067465, where Justice Paul Haerle
of the First District Court of Appeal in San Francisco refused, without opinion, to grant a writ of mandate to
overturn a lower court decision by Judge Lawrence G. Antolini, who refused to abide by the sentencing
mandates of Three Strikes).
110. See Bill Kisliuk, Losing Judge Draws Blueprint for Blocking "3 Strikes" Challenges, THE
RECoRDER, Dec. 19, 1994, at I (reporting the case of People v. SuperiorCt. wherein Justice Hearle remarked
in dissent that "our trial courts must be guided by what the Legislature says in these circumstances .... Those
who may want to change that must understand that any change must come via the political process and not via
a case-by-case evisceration of the Three Strikes law").
I 11. Jeff Brown, PoliticsandPleaBargaining: Victims' Rights in California,45 HASTiNGs L.J. 697, 697
n.l (1994) (book review); Steven A. Capps, Jury's Out on Effect Three Strikes will Have, S.F. EXAm., Mar.
8, 1994, at Al.
112. Braun & Pasternak, supra note 16, at Al; see id. at A17 (reporting that 16 states are considering
laws that would mandate life in prison on third felony convictions including Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri. New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
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parole for third-time serious offenders."' Considered, along with California's
Three Strikes, to be one of the strictest habitual offender statutes in the country,
Washington's law still requires that the final strike be a serious felony rather than
merely a felony, as with Three Strikes.11 4 Similarly, Texas has had, since 1974,
its own recidivist statute that mandates sentences from twenty-five years to life

in prison for twice-convicted prior felons." 5 However, as with Washington's law,
the Texas statute currently requires violent third offenses, leaving its effect still
more lenient than California's law. 1 6 In addition, Texas' statute allows judicial
discretion whereby trial judges may sentence defendants charged with thirddegree felonies to lesser punishments. 17 So, although other states have also passed similar three strikes laws, they nevertheless fail to match the severity of

California's Three Strikes.
Although the three strikes laws in California and Washington are still in their
infancy, Texas has had a chance to accumulate experience with its recidivist
statute and has found it to be effective in reducing property crimes but ineffective
in reducing the incidence of violent crime. 18 However, Texas' law has, since its

enactment, been diluted by early release programs, good-time credits, and other
sentence reductions that may account for its lack of effectiveness. 1 9 Caps on inmate populations following enactment of the Texas law also caused it to fall into

113. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.120 (West Supp. 1994).
114. WASH. INmATivE MEAsuRE593 §§ 1-8 (West 1993).
115. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West 1994).
116. Id. § 12.35(c) (West 1994). Texas' three strikes law was significantly amended in 1983 to its present
form requiring that third strikes be committed with a deadly weapon. Id.
117. Id. § 12.44(a)-(b) (West 1994); see State v. Allen, 865 S.W.2d 472,473-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(holding that a trial judge may sentence a defendant charged with a third-degree felony to a lesser punishment,
according to the gravity and circumstances of the charged offense, but noting that Texas Penal Code § 12.42
provides that a habitual felon shall be sentenced to life imprisonment after the state proves that the defendant
has been convicted of two prior felonies); see also Mandatory Statutes/HabitualFelons/Misdemeanor
Punishment/PenalCode § 12.42(d), TEx. LAW., Dec. 6,1993, at 21 (summarizing the arguments of counsel
in State v. Allen, and noting that, although Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court has discretion
to impose reduced sentences, the court accepted the State's argument that the trial court may not sentence the
defendant to a misdemeanor punishment where the State had proved the prior felony convictions). The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has also held that such a sentence under Texas Penal Code § 12.42(d) does not
violate the defendant's constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment, noting that, although
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution require the punishment to be proportionate to the
offense, a disproportionate sentence will stand, provided that the sentence is not "grossly disproportionate."
Lackey v. State, 881 S.W.2d 418, 421-22 (rex. Crim. App. 1994); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264-65
(1980); see infra notes 139-162 and accompanying text (discussing the proportionality argument as it pertains
to three strikes laws).
118. Pamela L Podger, Texas Grapplingwith 'Three Strikes," SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 14, 1994, at A3.
119. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.44 (West 1994); see Podger, supra note 118, at A3 (describing
amendments to Texas three strikes law); see also Note: Selective Incapacitation:Reducing Crime Through
Predictionsof Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 531-32 (1982) (citing studies that suggest one reason the
Texas law failed where the California law might not is that incapacitation effects in Texas are more expensive
due the fact that high-rate offenders are less active in that state, thus requiring, for instance, a 30% increase in
the incarceration rate for robbers in order to achieve a 10% reduction in the robbery rate).
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disuse, thus curtailing its application before it had the chance for long-term
implementation.2

The federal government attempted to join the States with its own measures
aimed primarily at violent felons.' These bills, known as the Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1993 and the Violent Crime and Law En-

forcement Act of 1993, like those that resulted in the Texas and Washington
statutes, fell short of imposing life sentences for nonviolent and non-serious

three-time felons. These federal three strikes bills provided mandatory life sentences only where the defendant had committed a crime of violence after having

accumulated one or more prior convictions for crimes of violence, felony drug
offenses, or a combination of the two." In addition, the federal measures were

further limited by their application only to third-time federal offenses.

2 Thus, the

federal three strikes laws again fell short of the severe sanctions imposed in California and were ultimately tabled in 1994.
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Public anger and fear over increasing violent crime in California has clearly

resulted in a demand for anti-crime legislation such as Three Strikes. The
amended version of Penal Code section 667, along with section 1170.12, added

120. Podger, supranote 118, at A3.
121. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 621-642 (1994); H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2408,
5111 (1994); see Linda L. Ammons, DiscretionaryJustice: a Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use
of the Clemency Power in the Cases of IncarceratedBattered Women, 3 J.L. & PoL'Y 2, 44 n.164 (1994)
(describing H.R. 3355 as a compilation of 34 anti-crime bills, introduced or approved by the House of
Representatives during 1994, whose three strikes provisions mandate life in prison for any person who is
convicted of a third violent crime when the last crime was a federal crime).
122. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Seass. §§ 621-642 (1994); see Hearingson H.R. 3315 and H.R. 3355
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Crim. Just.of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,103d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1994) (statement of Randolph N. Stone, Chairperson of the Criminal Justice Section on behalf of the
American Bar Association) (discussing the ramifications of H.R. 3315 and 3355). See generally Holly Idelson,
Highlightsof House Crime Bill, CONG. Q., Apr. 23, 1994, at 1002 (outlining the provisions of the federal three
strikes law).
123. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 621-642 (1994); see Hearingson H.R. 3315 and H.R. 3355
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Crim. Just. of the House Comm on the Judiciary,103d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1994) (statement of Randolph N. Stone, Chairperson of the Criminal Justice Section on behalf of the
American Bar Association) (discussing the ramifications of H.R. 3315 and 3355); John Kolbe, Crime Bill
Flip-flop Is Politicsas Usual, PHOENIX GAZErrE, Aug. 24, 1994, at B7 (opining that the federal three strikes
law was concerned more with political consensus-building than with addressing the problem of recidivism);
see also Harris Fawell, Press Release on the House Crime Control Conference Report, Aug. 22, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (observing that the federal crime bill contains a "watered-down version
of the so-called 'Three Strikes and You're Out' provision" and imposes mandatory life imprisonment without
parole for criminals convicted of three violent crimes or serious drug offenses). Fawell also opines that, at first
blush, the bill seems to contain a strong crime control provision, but that, as reported by the Conference
Committee, the provision is "weak and ineffective." Id. The fundamental flaw, according to Fawell, is that the
third strike must be a federal crime or drug offense and, "[s]ince 95% of violent crimes fall under state and
local statutes, few criminals will be affected by this provision." Id.
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by Proposition 184, were proposed to answer this demand.

24

Yet much of the

public debate regarding these anti-recidivist laws still focuses on the question of
whether this implementation of Three Strikes is the right answer or whether it

goes too far, perhaps without even being able to achieve its intended results.
A. The Theory Underlying Three Strikes
Recidivism, and its indication of an offender's tendency to repeat criminal

activity, poses a manifest danger to society."z A court's consideration of this
proclivity in sentencing is consistent with the social-protection function of criminal law, which seeks to guard the public from criminal activity by identifying

repeat offenders and incapacitating them before the damage is done rather than
after society has been further victimized."2 This function is distinct from other
justifications for punishment such as retribution,127 deterrence, 128or reform, 129and
has gained momentum in the face of eroding public
confidence in the ability of
30
correctional programs to rehabilitate offenders.
124. ASSEMBLY COMMITrE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 971, at 2 (Jan. 6, 1994);
see Otten, supra note 34 (reporting on a special state legislative session ordered by California Governor Pete
Wilson on the subject of stricter sentences for violent criminals and citing statements by Wilson referring to
the kidnapping and murder of Polly Klaas in arguing for public support of anti-crime legislation); see also
supranotes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing public support for anti-crime legislation).
125. People v. Karsai, 131 Cal. App. 3d 224,242, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406,417 (1982).
126. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON
CRIME RATES 64 (1978) [hereinafter DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION] (asserting that incapacitation seeks
to remove offenders from society, thus reducing crime by physically preventing them from committing more
crimes in society); see also id, at 64-79 (defining incapacitation as a strategy for public protection and assessing
the incapacitative effect of imprisonment); Kenneth R. Zuetel, Jr., Comment, Senate Bill 42 and the Myth of
ShortenedSentences for CaliforniaOffenders: The Effects of the Uniform DeterminateSentencing Act, 14 SAN
DmoL. REv. 1176, 1182 (1977) (discussing the notion of incapacitation and its function "to protect society
from the premature release of dangerous criminals"). Thus, the concern over life sentences handed down for
nonviolent third offenses must be balanced against concerns such as those voiced by some county district
attorneys, that failure to incapacitate a repeat offender after his or her third offense, even if nonviolent, might
cost the life of an innocent person victimized during the defendant's fourth strike. See, e.g., Debate, supranote

10 (reflecting the opinion of one Sacramento district attorney).
127. See SANIRD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CpRiINAL LAW AND ITS PROcEssES: CASES
AN MATERIMS 137-48 (discussing retributive theory and its basis in the notion that it is right for wrongdoers
to be punished, completely aside from other purposes of punishment).
128. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supranote 126, at 19 (noting that all theories of general

deterrence are based on the notion that the imposition of sanctions on detected offenders creates a deterrent
to others who might otherwise engage in similar conduct); see also KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supranote 127,
at 149 (discussing specific deterrence as involving punishment that leaves particular offenders less likely to
repeat their crimes and general deterrence as the same dissuasion accomplished by example through the
sentences of others); cf. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitationas a Strategy for Crime Control: Possibilitiesand
Piytalls, in 5 CjME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OFRESEARcH 1-84 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds., 1983)
(noting that incapacitation does not involve deterrence (a modification of behavior), but rather makes it

impossible to repeat the offense since the offender is incarcerated).
129. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 127, at 153-59 (discussing the reform function of the
criminal law as an attempt to modify offenders' penchant for criminal behavior).
130. See A. Murray, et al., Prison Reform: Backward or Forward?,50 CAL. ST. B.J. 356,361 (1975)
(discussing the failure of the rehabilitative function of the California State prison system); see also Michael
Vitiello, ReconsideringRehabilitation,65 TUL L. REV. 1011, 1014-26 (1991) (discussing the criminal justice
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Selective incapacitation is one means to further the protective goals of
criminal punishment. Selective incapacitation provides individualized sentences

based on predictions that particular types of offenders would commit serious

offenges at a high rate if not incarcerated.'

This method, however, suffers from

many ethical and predictive problems: First, because most people would agree
that punishment should be deserved and not based merely on some statistical pre-

dictor; and 2second, because there is no completely reliable way to predict
3
recidivism.
Three Strikes operates under the principle of collective incapacitation whereby all people convicted of designated offenses' with second and third iterations
receive the same sentence enhancement.'33 This method avoids some of the
objections to selective incapacitation while protecting society from offenders,
34
who are imprisoned and thus unable to commit crimes in the free community.,
First, the notion that a punishment should be deserved is less offended by a law
that takes into account a totality of circumstances which reflect a defendant's tendency to repeat felonious conduct. Second, the concern that there is no fool-proof
predictor of criminal conduct remains valid, but is less compelling when faced
with an actual history of recidivism and presents a more common-sense means
to identify repeat offenders
than other, as yet, undeveloped means of predicting
13

criminal behavior.

Statutes employing incapacitation strategies have experienced a measure of
success. Although the concept has been criticized by some legal commentators
citing studies that have found the crime-reduction effect of incapacitation to be

a mere ten to seventeen percent, other studies indicate more favorable statistics,

system's rejection of the rehabilitative rationale); Zuetel, supra note 126, at 1180-82 (citing the failure of
rehabilitation as one of the reasons for California's abandonment of indeterminate sentencing); see also infra
notes 174-177 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of the rehabilitative rationale as a justification
for discretionary sentencing). But see Vitiello supra, at 1032-37 (hypothesizing that the rehabilitative model
may have been prematurely discarded in light of recent findings regarding the effectiveness of rehabilitation).
131. See generally Cohen, supranote 128, at 1-84 (discussing collective and selective incapacitation).
132. Id. at 1-84. See generally Leonard J.Long, Rethinking Selective Incapacitation:More at Stake tian
Controlling Violent Crime, 62 UMKCL. REV. 107 (1993) (analyzing the relationship between the methods to
predict criminal dangerousness, the punishment decisions to incapacitate predictably dangerous offenders, and
the rights of those offenders).
133. Cohen, supra note 128, at 1-84 (discussing the pros and cons of collective incapacitation as a
strategy for crime control).
134. KADISH & SCHULHOFER,supra note 127, at 161.
135. A predictive method that attempts to forecast individual behavior from collective statistics suffers
from the inability of those statistics to account for anything other than aggregate behavior. Whereas collective
incapacitation, although perhaps being overinclusive, sentences groups of similar offenders based on group
tendencies. See Long, supra note 132, at 107 (illustrating this point with a quote from Arthur Conan Doyle's
Sherlock Holmes, observing that "[w]hile the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he
becomes a mathematical certainty. You can, for example, never foretell what any one man will do, but you can
say with precision what an average number will be up to.").
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with one estimating a thirty-one percent
reduction in violent crime and a forty136

two percent reduction in burglary.
Thus, because Three Strikes considers actual prior criminal convictions, it
may perhaps be the best answer to the need for public protection, since the
Constitution prohibits the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law137 and therefore prevents the punishment of a defendant before he or she has
acted, based on some as-yet undeveloped predictor of recidivist behavior. In the
face of conflicting studies regarding the effect of collective incapacitation on the
rate of recidivism, the need remains for some means of identifying and incarcerating repeat offenders where eighty percent of all crimes are committed by
about twenty percent of the criminal population, thirty-five percent of whom,
have been in prison before. 38 Three Strikes provides a middle ground by incapacitating defendants who have demonstrated a tendency toward recidivism and
have not merely intended to commit but have committed repeat offenses. Thus the
law, as with numerous other sentence enhancement statutes, elevates the penalty
to match the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's criminal
behavior.
Regardless of the merits of the philosophical and legal underpinnings of
Three Strikes, challenges will undoubtedly abound with regard to the law's apparent disproportionate treatment of defendants, its denial of alternative programs
and term credits, its effect on control of the prison population, and its consideration of prior juvenile offenses. The remainder of Part IV will discuss these
issues.
B. The EighthAmendment and the ProportionalityArgument: Prohibiting
Cruel or Unusual Punishment
California's three strikes law seeks to prevent recidivism by providing an

increasingly compelling deterrent for repeat offenders as they garner multiple
convictions. However, one of the primary concerns over the new law is its failure
to distinguish between degrees of felonious conduct in constituting a third strike.
While first and second strikes must be either "serious," as defined in California
Penal Code section 1192.7, or "violent," as defined in section 667.5, the law

136. Cohen, supra note 128, at 1-84 (citing the results of six studies on the effects of selective
incapacitation with crime-reduction figures ranging from less than 10% in two studies to between 14% and
17% in four others); KADISH & SCHUu-OFER, supranote 127, at 161 (citing the results of a Rand Corporation
study showing more favorable statistics).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Jill Smolowe, ...And Throw Away the Key: America's Overcrowded Prisons Have Failed as a
Deterrent.Building More of Them and Imposing Longer Sentences May Only Increase the Crime Rate, TBME,

Feb. 7, 1994, at 54, 56-57.
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merely requires that the third strike be a "felony."' 9 This creates the possibility
of a scenario such as the one frequently referred to by Marc Klaas, founder of the
Polly Klaas Foundation and outspoken opponent of Three Strikes' inclusion of
nonviolent third-time felons, in arguing against Proposition 184 and AB 971.,40

This hypothetical situation depicts an aging defendant who faces a felony prosecution for writing a bad check but who, as a teenager, twice stole a bicycle from
someone's garage in youthful indiscretion. The 50-year-old felon then faces the
possibility of a life sentence of twenty-five years to life under either Penal Code
section 667 or 1170.12. t41 This scenario showcases many of the primary issues
surrounding Three Strikes and will be referred to again when arguments pertaining to those issues are addressed in this Note.
The situation described above highlights the most hotly debated aspect of
Three Strikes: disproportionate punishment of criminal offenders. The Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 17 of the
California Constitution proscribe the infliction of cruel and unusual punish-

ment.1 42 This principle that the punishment imposed should not be greatly disproportionate to the crime committed can be found in English law dating back as far
as 1215 to the Magna Charta's143 requirement that "amercements," or fines, not

be excessive.' 44 English common law courts later adopted this principle as a basic
tenet of English law. 45

Proportionate sentencing serves general utilitarian goals designed to foster respect for the criminal justice system in society.'46 Yet the proportionality principle

139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1995); see Id. (requiring that first and second felony
convictions constitute serious or violent felonies but remaining silent regarding the nature of the third felony
conviction); see also id. § 1170.12(b)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring, as with section 667, that prior
felonies be serious or violent offenses but making no such requirement for current felonies); supra note 62

(listing felonies defined by statute to constitute "serious" felonies); supranote 63 (listing felonies defined by

statute to constitute "violent" felonies).
140. Marc Klaas opposed both AB 971 and Proposition 184 because of their inclusion of nonviolent third
felonies and their predicted financial drain on California's economy. Prop. 184: Why Even Polly Klaas' Father
Says it's
a Big Mistake, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 24, 1994, at B8.
141. Marc Klaas, Argument Against Proposition184, 1994 California Ballot Pamphlet, Nov. 8, 1994
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
142. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
143. See Magna Charta, 25 Edw., ch. 17 (1297); see id. (codifying Magna Charta, chs. 20-25 (1215),
reprinted in I Statutes of the Realm 116 (London 1810)).
144. See Barton C. Legum, "Down the Road Toward Human Decency:" Eighth Amendment
Proportionality Analysis and Solem v. Helm, 18 GA. L. REV.109,124-26 (1983) (discussing the development,
in American jurisprudence, of the principle that the punishment must fit the crime).
145. Id at 126 (discussing the evolution of the proportionality debate in the context of Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
146. Where the legal gradation of crimes diverges from the dictates of commonsense scale, there is a
risk of resulting contempt for the law. See Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment
Challenges to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent to
Precedent," 27 ARIz. L. REV. 25, 26 (1985) (observing that the proportionality doctrine "prohibits a
punishment more severe than that deserved by the criminal for the harm caused and the moral blameworthiness
exhibited"). Thus, disproportionate sentencing may lead people to question their generally held beliefs
regarding what constitutes a serious or minor offense. See also A. C. Ewing, A Study of Punishment II:
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is primarily concerned with retribution and seeks to ensure that criminals receive

the "just deserts" of their crimes.147 Thus, the retributive rationale would reason
that, once a defendant has been convicted of a crime, justice demands that he or
she be punished, but with a severity no greater than what the defendant
"deserves." This type of proportionate sentencing punishes defendants under a
more narrow rubric, insuring that defendants are treated on an individual basis
rather according to purely utilitarian purposes. 4
Since the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Lynch,149 lower state
courts have repeatedly held that statutory penalties that are grossly excessive in
relation to the crime violate California's constitutional prohibition against "cruel
or unusual punishment."ts Thus, those opposed to Three Strikes cite cases similar
to that of the 50-year-old man who wrote a bad check as examples of penalties
-in this case, twenty-five years to life-that are so disproportionate to the crime
that they offend the constitutional proscription of cruel or unusual punishment. t'
Although the defendant must have committed two prior serious or violent
felonies to qualify for Three Strikes' most severe sentence enhancement, the fact
remains that it is the current felony for which the defendant is being sentenced
and that a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence, if examined in isolation, would
certainly be grossly disproportionate to the crime of passing a bad check. 52

Punishment as Viewed by the Philosopher,21 CANADIAN B. REv. 102, 115 (1943) (arguing that to punish a
lesser crime more severely than a greater would be "either to suggest to men's minds that the former was worse
when it was not, or, if they could not accept this, to bring the penal law in some degree into discredit or
ridicule"). Ewing also suggests that disproportionate penalties can make the criminal appear to be the victim
of cruel laws and thus detract attention away from the criminal act and toward the cruelty of the punishment.

Id.
147. Allyn G. Heald, Criminal Law: United States v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningful
ProportionalityPrinciple,58 BROOK. L. REv. 455,456 (1992).
148. Id. at 456.
149. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
150. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,424,503 P.2d 921,930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,226 (1972); see id. (holding
that a punishment may violate article 1. section 6, of the California Constitution, even though its method is not
cruel or unusual, if it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it "shocks the conscience
and offends fundamental notions of human dignity").
151. See, e.g., Colvin & Rohrlich, supra note 88, at Al (recounting the case of a shoplifter who faced
a third-strike after being caught with a few dollars' worth of purloined pancake mix, syrup, sausages, and KoolAid); How "Three Strikes" Law Is Used, supra note 72, at A7 (citing, as an example of discretionary
prosecution under Three Strikes, the filing of a third-strike felony against a defendant with two prior robbery
convictions who allegedly stole a piece of pizza from two children having lunch on a Redondo Beach pier).
152. See In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 919, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (1974) (holding
that, in determining whether a punishment is so disproportionate to the offense as to be cruel or unusual, the
court must consider factors relating to the current offense, such as the danger to society posed by the offense
and the offender); see also Wayne S. Grajewski, Prohibiting Cruel or Unusual Punishment: California's
Requirement of ProportionateSentencingAfter Wingo and Rodriguez, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 524, 530-31 (1976)
(discussing the effect of In re Lynch and In re Foss on California's then-indeterminate sentencing system and
stating that, under Wingo, courts must examine the facts of individual cases to determine whether the particular
punishment therein is disproportionate). Although the hypothetical case of the bad check writer does not
involve the imposition of a maximum sentence under California's prior indeterminate sentencing scheme, it
does involve a sentence enhancement that would normally be imposed for an aggravated offense, but is instead
being inflicted for non-aggravated conduct. However, similar punishments have been determined to be

PacificLaw Journal/ Vol. 26
Indeed, the three-pronged test of proportionality of punishment first used by

the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm 15 would lead to the conclusion
that such a punishment was disproportionate. The Solem test involves comparison
of the harshness of the penalty with the gravity of the crime, comparison of the

penalty with corresponding punishments for the same crime in otherjurisdictions,
and comparison of the penalty with those for more serious crimes in the same
t5
jurisdiction."
Comparing the gravity of writing a bad check with the severity of

a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence in state prison would lead most reasonable
people to find disproportionality. Furthermore, the punishment for passing a bad
check, both in California and in other jurisdictions, would be far less than twenty-

five years to life if the current felony alone was considered. 55 Comparison with
more serious felonies would show that the current punishment certainly
exceeds
51 6
disproportionality.
suggesting
thus
crimes,
serious
more
for
those

However, any proportionality examination must take into account the defendant's prior offenses, a consideration that has become an undeniable part of

sentencing law. According to the California Supreme Court's decision in the case
of People v. Dillon,"7 the trial judge must look beyond the Solem factors in

determining whether a sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment and must
additionally look at the totality of the circumstances with respect to both the
offense and the offender.15 8 Moreover, People v. Wingo

59

held that any propor-

tionality analysis must depend on the particular facts of each individual case."6
Thus, as part of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant, the

court may consider recidivism in determining whether the particular punishment
is disproportionate to the offense committed.

The California courts appear to have moved beyond the simple pronouncement of In re Lynch 16' and have expressed a willingness to consider factors in

proportionate under California's present determinate sentencing system. See, e.g., People v. Curry, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 181, 187, 142 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1977) (holding that punishment, under a state statute providing that
convictions were misdemeanors but second convictions were felonies, did not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); infra note 162 and accompanying text.
153. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
154. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 305 (1983).
155. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 476a(a) (West Supp. 1995) (penalizing with a maximum term of one
year in the state prison or county jail, one who, with the requisite knowledge and intent, passes a bad check);
iU£§ 476a(b) (restricting imprisonment to the county jail where the total amount of the checks does not exceed
$200).
156. See, e.g., id. § 264(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the crime of rape is punishable by a three-,
six-, or eight-year term of imprisonment); see also Grajewski, supranote 152, at 534 (discussing examples of
disproportionate consideration of single sentences).
157. 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
158. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441,479, 668 P.2d 697,720-21, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 413-14 (1983);
see id. (considering in its analysis of proportionality, in addition to the nature of the crime, the characteristics
of the offender-specifically the defendant's individual culpability, age, prior criminal record, personal
characteristics, and state of mind).
159. 14 Cal. 3d 169,534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975).
160. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 177, 534 P.2d 1001, 1008, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1975).
161. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
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addition to the current offense. The Second District of the California Court of
Appeal has held, in a case very similar to that of the hypothetical check bouncer,
that the Legislature can provide for greatly enhanced penalties short of the death
sentence based on circumstances not currently before the court. 12 IfThree Strikes
fails, it will not be from a sudden Eighth Amendment challenge but more likely
from gradual erosion such as judicial refusal to enforce the law or from the inability of the criminal justice system to accommodate the added financial burdens
brought about by the law.
C. Three Strikes' ChannelingFunction:Denial ofAlternative Programsand
Term Credits
California Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 channel convicted thirdstrike felons directly to state prison and eliminate the possibility of sentencing
offenders to alternative programs or other facilities.' 63 Both laws specifically prohibit probation and suspended sentences for second and third strikes and ignore
the length of time between the prior felony conviction and the current conviction
for the purpose of imposing sentences."4 Three Strikes also expressly prohibits
commitment to any facility other than the state prison, including eligibility for
commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center.165 Yet this channeling
function, diverting felons past alternative programs directly to prison, dismisses
the value of judicial discretion in determining a punishment suitable for each
individual defendant as well as the rehabilitative effect of state programs.
Judicial sentencing discretion has long been considered an integral part of
American criminal law.'66 Thus, the roles of legally-bound agents, such as police
and trial judges, have been combined with those of discretionary agents, such as
prison officials, parole board members, and sentencing judges, in an effort to address society's desires for both social control and protection of the rights of the
accused.' 67 In order to individualize punishment, statutes have employed dis

162. People v. Curry, 76 Cal. App. 3d 181, 187, 142 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1977) (holding that
punishment, under a state statute providing that first convictions were misdemeanors but second convictions

were felonies, did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). The court
reasoned that this enhancement did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment because: (1) There was nothing
prohibiting the Legislature from imposing penalties of less than life in prison for repeated acts of public
indecency, and (2) the penalty imposed did not constitute extreme penalization). Id.
163. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1995); id. § 1170.12(a)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1995).
164. Id. § 667(c)(2)-(3); id.
§ 1170.12(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1995).
165. Id. § 667(c)(4) (West Supp. 1995); id. § 1170.12(a)(4) (West Supp. 1995); see CAL.WEU. &INST.
CODE §§ 3050-3054 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (containing provisions for involuntary commitment of persons
convicted of crimes and establishing the California Rehabilitation Center).
166. See Larry I. Palmer, The Role ofAppellate Courts in Mandatory Sentencing Schemes, 26 UCLA L.
REV. 753, 755-58 (1979) (discussing four assumptions underlying American criminal law in the context of

discretion insentencing).
167. Id. at 753-54. The labels "legally-bound" and "free" or "discretionary" are somewhat misleading
since both types of actors are, in a sense, legally bound and also exercise some degree of discretion. Still, the
terms are used in current legal literature to distinguish between agents exercising different levels of discretion
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judges broad discretion to tailor the sencretionary factors in sentencing, giving
68
tence to the individual defendant.
Some commentators have justified the use of discretionary free agents 69 to
individualize punishment as necessary to achieve the goals of reformation and
rehabilitation.170 This argument states that any imposition of limits on the discretion of sentencing judges must contemplate multiple levels of discretion with
great latitude for departure from those limits in the interest ofjustice.' 7 1Without
opportunity for the exercise of discretion, statutorily imposed mandatory sentencing guidelines such as those in Three Strikes have often been considered
unjust and have been nullified or ignored by juries, judges, and proscutors.17
Despite these arguments, legislatures and voters have enacted mandatory
sentencing schemes and other limits on the discretion of sentencing authorities to
provide a greater deterrent to felonious conduct for those who have demonstrated

a resistance to rehabilitative attempts. 73 Thus, notwithstanding concerns over removing discretion from the hands of judges, public dissatisfaction, such as that
prompting enactment of AB 971, has led to the adoption of sentencing guidelines
and mandatory prison terms such as Three Strikes.
Perhaps the most reasonable explanation for this apparent disregard for the
philosophical justifications underlying discretionary sentencing lies in the public's rejection of the rehabilitative rationale for incarceration." 4 This rejection is
mirrored in a statement by a repeat felon who described jail as a place where
"[y]ou get healthy, you sleep good, you eat good, you get cable TV ....They
don't rehab you at all. They don't teach you anything... so these guys come out
and do the same thing all over again.' 75 Some critics of rehabilitation maintain
that conditions in California prisons make self-rehabilitation practically impos-

in the criminal justice system.
168. Larry I. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions:An Alternative to Official Discretion in

Sentencing, 62 Geo. LJ.1, 1-6 (1973) [hereinafter Criminal Dispositions].
169. See supranote 167 and accompanying text (defining "discretionary" or"free!" agents in the criminal
justice context).
170. Criminal Dispositions, supra note 168, at 3-4.
171. Daniel J.Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretionof Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ.1681, 1683 (1992).
172. Md at 1683. See generally Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Not.So-Blissful Ignorance:Informing
JurorsAbout Punishment in MandatorySentencing Cases, 20 AM. CPlM. L. ReV. 343 (1983) (discussing
instances where judges, juries, or prosecutors have nullified oppressive laws by ignoring them in deliberations
or sentencing, in order to avoid imposing disproportionate penalties).
173. See supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text (listing other mandatory sentencing schemes),

California's movement from an indeterminate to a determinate sentencing scheme in 1976 is one example of

a beginning trend toward restricted discretion. Zuetel, supra note 126, at 1178-86; see Id.(discussing
California's history of indeterminate sentencing and the rationale for its adoption of determinate sentencing).
Besides serving to discourage criminal behavior, determinate sentencing has been adopted to provide for
greater uniformity of sentencing and to provide greater predictability to inmates regarding the lengths of their
terms. See generally Palmer, supranote 166, at 753-54 (1979) (describing the value of uniform sentencing to

alleviate inmate frustration).
174. Smolowe, supranote 138, at 58.
175. Id. at 58.
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sible. 176 Therefore, just as the state's old indeterminate sentencing scheme provided a deterrent to prisoners who became discouraged by the unpredictability of
discretionary agents, critics opine that continued judicial discretion and rehabilitative sentencing do nothing to address public demand for reduction in habitual
criminal conduct.' 77
Critics of indeterminate sentencing have argued that public safety should be
the primary concern and that, since there is no reliable test by which to predict a
prisoner's potential danger to society, the prison system should err on the side of
confinement. 178 Thus, a serious doubt about the efficacy of alternative programs
translates to a likelihood of the injury and death of innocent people who might
have been otherwise protected had the offender been imprisoned and retained
under an enhanced sentencing scheme.
Regardless of the scholarly arguments for judicial discretion and those
expounding the benefits of rehabilitation, people in California as well as the rest
of the country have registered their dissatisfaction with the status quo, with
seventy-two percent of California voters favoring Three Strikes and eighty-one
percent of all Americans in favor of laws like Three Strikes that require enhanced
179
prison terms for anyone convicted of three serious crimes.
D. The Effect of IncreasedSentence Durationand Good-Time Credits on
Recidivism and PrisonerControl
Three Strikes, in addition to providing virtually certain imprisonment for
recidivist serious or violent felons, significantly increases the duration of sentences for repeat offenders.180 One hypothetical scenario involves a defendant
with one prior conviction for residential burglary who is subsequently convicted
of a similar crime. Assuming that the offender receives a typical prison sentence
for the current offense, additional prison sentences for the prior offense, and the
maximum number of credits for participation in work or education programs, a

176. Zuetel, supra note 126, at 1181 (arguing that the poor living conditions in California prisons cause
inmates to abandon self-rehabilitative efforts in favor of more short-sighted but necessary issues of survival).
177. Id. at 1181 n.37.
178. SAmEL HALLECK, PsycHATRY AND THE DIEM.MAS OF CRiME 313-14 (1967); Joshua Diamond,

The PsychiatricPredictionof Dangerousness,123 U. PA. L. REV. 439,443 (1974); Robert Morris, The Future
ofImprisonment: Towarda Punitive Philosophy, 72 MicH. L. REV. 1161, 1164-73 (1974); Eugene Steadman
& Anthony Cocozza, We Can't Predict Who is Dangerous, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan. 1975, at 32. One author
observed that this preference for confinement does, in fact, occur and reasoned that, due to society's inability
to predict dangerousness, we tend to overemphasize an offender's potential threat and impose longer
sentences). Sue Titus Reid, A Rebuttal to the Attack on the IndeterminateSentence, 51 WASH. L. REv. 565,
573-82 (1976).
179. Morain & Ellis, supra note 9, at A3; see Lacayo, supra note 15, at 53 (citing the results of a
Yankelovich Partners Inc. nationwide telephone poll of 1000 adult Americans taken for TIME/CNN between
January 17 and 18, 1994, and showing 81% public support for bills like AB 971); see also InitiativeorNo
Initiative, "Three Strikes" Is the Law in California,supra note 27, at 3 (citing pre-election polls that indicated
over 80% support for Proposition 184).
180. See supranotes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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4.5-year sentence under the Penal Code prior to enactment of Three Strikes would
become a 10.4-year sentence under current law.' 81 An even more dramatic
example shows a two-year sentence becoming a twenty-five-years-to-life sen-

tence for a defendant, with two prior serious or violent felonies, convicted of
receiving stolen property.' Thus, in keeping with the deterrence goals of Three
Strikes, recidivist serious or violent felons will receive both certain and aug-

mented penalties for second and subsequent offenses.
While these exacerbated penalties are designed to combat recidivism by
acting as deterrents to those who would commit multiple felonies, some legal

scholars and criminologists argue that no evidence has been found to suggest that
longer sentences deter crime. 8 While a minority argues that increased severity
of punishment has no deterrent effect, most critics suggest that there is at least a
doubtful correlation between severity of punishment and deterrence.184 Still, other
legal scholars espouse a more common-sense view, concluding that, in general,
the preventive effect of criminal sanctions increases with the severity of the

punishment.'85
Three Strikes, as well as increasing the duration of prison sentences, restricts
the availability of credits that reduce the offender's time in prison.'8 6 In addition
to the argument that increased penalties do not necessarily have their expected
deterrent effect, many opponents of Three Strikes, prison officials, and corrections officers argue that by limiting the discretion of parole boards, a significant tool of prisoner control is removed.8 7 In the words of one Southern Cali-

fornia corrections officer, "If there's no time off for good behavior, what can you
use to bargain with an inmate?"'188 Therefore, there are legitimate fears that
181. Illustrationsof Changes in PrisonSentencing Law: Legislative Analyst'sAnalysis of Proposition
184, Nov. 8. 1994 California General Election, at 34 (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal): see id.
(calculating the hypothetical prison term as follows: Under prior law, the defendant would serve four years plus
five years of sentence enhancements divided by two, assuming the maximum allowable credits for participation
in work and education programs for a total of 4.5 years; under Three Strikes, the defendant would serve twice
the sentence under prior law, or eight years, plus the applicable sentence enhancement of five years for a total
of 13 years, less the new maximum credit of 20% resulting in a total net time of 10.4 years).
182. Ia at 34.
183. See California Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure, PROGRESS REPORT, DETERRENT
EF"Ecrs OF CIM1NAL SANCrtONS 7 (May 1968) (citing results of a study showing that, among adult prison

inmates surveyed, over half indicated that they had not been restrained in their criminal activity because of
knowledge regarding sanctions).
184. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supranote 127, at 150-51.
185. See, e.g., Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV.

949, 965-70 (1966) (citing severe punishments in dictatorships as examples of the deterrent effect of more
severe sanctions).
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995) (limiting the total amount of credits awarded
pursuant to Penal Code article 2.5 (commencing with § 2930) to one-fifth of the total term of imprisonment
imposed and providing that credits cannot begin to accrue until the defendant physically enters the state
prison). However, a drafting problem with AB 971 and Proposition 184 has resulted in a consensus that the
prohibition on accumulation of good-time credits while the defendant is in jail awaiting trial is ineffective.
Green, supranote 12, at A3; Debate, supra note 10.
187. Joe Domanick, Who's Guarding the Guards,L.A. WKLY., Sept. 2, 1994, at 20,24-25.
188. Id. at 24-25.
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California's prisons may become engorged with unruly inmates believing they
have nothing to lose.
While it would indeed seem logical that the ability to control the prison
population would be hindered by removing incentives such as good-time credits,
psychologists have proposed that a large proportion of prison violence may be
born from frustration over indefinite sentences and review boards perceived to be
capricious.189 In fact, according to many criminology experts, determinate sentencing laws with longer mandatory prison terms result in an aging and more
easily domitable prison population.'9 This would seem to portray a much different scenario than that depicted by opponents of Three Strikes and, instead,
forecast a less agitated and energetic group of prisoners.

Nevertheless, what may be a positive factor for prisoner control becomes
negative when limited prison resources are used to warehouse aged and presumably benign criminals who, even if they had the inclination, may no longer
be able to pose a threat to society. In addition, many of these prisoners may have
been incarcerated for nonviolent or non-serious felony convictions, perpetuating
the image of prisons full of aging and harmless offenders, in a world where more
dangerous criminals go free. Thus it may be argued that public funds could be
more efficiently allocated by releasing some aged criminals to make room for
others in the prime of their violent tendencies.
This argument seems based, however, on an entirely economic analysis and
disregards the value of taking whatever steps are necessary to remove violent
criminals from the streets. In other words, rather than releasing aging felons to
make room for new ones, it may be even more desirable to build more prisons to
house them all. While the criminal adjudication process does, through plea bargaining, account for other factors such as overcrowded dockets and overly burdened prosecutorial resources, the release of felons should not be based entirely
on considerations of prison conditions. Certainly it may be argued that a mandatory sentencing scheme which reduces the ability of prison administrators to
shorten sentences effectively reduces the number of cells available for more deserving occupants. Yet this argument ignores the value of incapacitating recidivists who have a proven record of criminal resilience and will, presumably,
continue to commit crimes if given the opportunity.
So, at least in the eyes of California voters and legislators, the argument for
incapacitation outweighs those for rehabilitation and prisoner control. Perhaps the

189. See Murray, supra note 130, at 361 (describing prisoner attitudes at Folsom, San Quentin,

Vacaville, and Soledad of lost incentive for self-rehabilitation due to uncertainty and apparently pointless
parole hearings).
190. See Jonathan Turley et al., Project for Older Prisoners: Report to the State of New York, at 8-9
(unpublished report, on file with the PacificLaw Journal)(asserting that, as inmates grow older, the cost of
their maintenance within the prison system dramatically increases, while the risk they pose to society
decreases).
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construction of more prison facilities, while tremendously costly, is a burden to

be willingly borne by citizens increasingly fearful of rampant crime.
E. The Use of Juvenile Court Records in Fixing Sentences in Subsequent
Adult CriminalProceedings

AB 971 has been criticized for its use of prior juvenile adjudications to constitute "strikes" that may result in sentence enhancements under the statute.
California Penal Code section 667, under the amendments of AB 971, allows the
use of prior felonies for sentence enhancements regardless of whether those
felonies and their concomitant sentences took place while the defendant was a

minor.' 9' This presents a potential problem due to the nature of a juvenile proceeding, which differs from the trial of an adult criminal defendant.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits any

state from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.' 92 Procedural due process has been held to include the right to a jury, the
93
right to counsel, and the right of confrontation in state criminal proceedings.,
Yet juvenile proceedings have typically been procedurally informal with
individualized, offender-oriented dispositions aimed more toward the rehabilitative function of the criminal law than toward other goals, such as retribution,
incapacitation, or deterrence. 194
Juvenile proceedings, in addition to having fewer
formal procedures, have almost universally excluded juries and lawyers. 95
Still, there can be no doubt that juveniles do have some due process rights. 9 6
In In re Gault, 97 the United States Supreme Court held that due process required
notice of charges, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,

191. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (allowing the use of prior juvenile
offenses for sentence enhancement if: (a) Tbejuvenile was at least 16 years old at the time the prior offense
was committed; (b) the prior offense was one of the enumerated offenses of Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 707(b)(1)-(2) as a felony; (c) it was found by the court to be "fit and proper" to deal with the juvenile under
juvenile law; and (d) the juvenile was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court because of an offense listed in
Welfare and Institutions Code § 707(b) in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code § 602).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
193. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee the right of an indigent defendant to state-provided counsel before he is sentenced to imprisonment);
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (applying the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to guarantee the
right of confrontation); Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that no person may be imprisoned

without first having had the opportunity of representation as granted by the Sixth Amendment); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states
incorporates the notion of trial by jury).
194. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile CourtLegislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
"RehabilitativeIdeal," 65 MINN. L. REv. 167, 170 (1981).
195. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers
Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J.CRiM. L. 1185, 1192 (1989).
196. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (citing several procedural due process rights constitutionally
mandated in juvenile proceedings); see also In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444,451,450 P.2d 296,299, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 1,4 (1969) (outlining due process rights found in juvenile court proceedings).
197. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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and the right to confrontation and cross-examination in a juvenile proceeding.' 9 '
Likewise, in In re Winship,'" the Court applied the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof to juvenile adjudications, 2 0 while in Breed v. Jones," it
extended the right to protection against double jeopardy to juvenile defendants.?2
Even though juveniles lack certain due process rights, sentencing judges have
been allowed to consider their criminal records. For instance, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, in Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers,20 3 responded to

the use of the defendant's prior juvenile record in a subsequent criminal prosecution by holding that the trial judge was entitled to all of the material facts to
acquaint himself with the past record of the offender in determining an appropriate penalty.2 4 On review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that prior
juvenile convictions could not be excluded from consideration where they were
to be used solely for the purpose of "imposing a fair, proper and just sentence. '' 0'
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have used arguments such as those
found in People v. Williams2w to conclude that courts may consider prior juvenile
adjudications to enhance adult sentences without violating due process. Here, the
Michigan Court of Appeals found no due process violation in the trial court's

consideration of the defendant's juvenile record and rejected her argument that
"the juvenile justice system is separate and distinct from the criminal justice
system" and that consideration ofjuvenile violations should thus be barred for the
purpose of sentence enhancement. 20 7 Many federal courts have also concluded
198. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-58.

199. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
200. In re Winship, 387 U.S. at 368.
201. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
202. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975) (deciding whether the prosecution of respondent as

an adult, after Juvenile Court proceedings which resulted in a finding that he had violated a criminal statute
by committing what, for an adult, would have been the crime of robbery, and a subsequent finding that he was
unfit for treatment as a juvenile, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution); see also Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 375,482 P.2d 664, 668, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752,
756 (1971) (holding, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Breed, that the protection against double
jeopardy was applicable to juvenile proceedings).
203. 126 A.2d 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
204. Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 126 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
205. Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 144 A.2d 367, 370 (Pa. 1958). But see Robert G.
Lane, Note, Use of Juvenile Court Records in Fixing Sentence in a Subsequent Adult Criminal Proceeding,
32 S. CAL L. REV. 207, 210 (1959) (noting the constitutional issue regarding the use of juvenile sentences for
adult sentencing as the fact that juvenile proceedings are not penal in nature and thus juvenile defendants do
not have access to constitutional and procedural safeguards present as a matter of right in adult criminal trials).
206. 382 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
207. People v. Williams, 382 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); see also Beaver v. State, 455
So.2d 253, 259-60 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that the judge could consider the defendant's failure
to completejuvenile probation in sentencing under the state's habitual offender statute); Walters v. State, 690
S.W.2d 122, 123 (Ark. 1985) (holding that a juvenile's prior California convictions, even if expunged, could
be used in Arkansas to enhance his sentence under that state's habitual offender statute); Rivers v. State, 616
So.2d 1090, 1090 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that juvenile convictions may be considered as prior

offenses for enhancement of adult defendants' sentences); Muir v. State, 517 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Md. 1986)
(holding that ajuvenile conviction could be used as a prior conviction under Maryland's enhanced punishment
statute); State v. Peterson, 331 N.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Minn. 1983) (holding that the defendant's adult sentence

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26

that juvenile violations may be considered as aggravating factors in adult federal
sentencing. 2 8 The Ninth Circuit has specifically and frequently concluded that
such a use of juvenile records does not offend due process. 209
California appellate courts have overwhelmingly held that juvenile convictions are relevant and may be considered in adult sentencing proceedings. The
California Supreme Court in People v. Cox 2t 0 held that evidence of two robberies
committed by the defendant while a minor were admissible during sentencing in
a death penalty case. 21' The Third District California Court of Appeal, in People
v. Hubbell,212 observed that a defendant whose juvenile record was being
considered in determining an appropriate sentence was not being punished for the
crime he committed as a juvenile. Rather, his juvenile record was being
2 3
considered as an aggravating circumstance under California's sentencing rules. ,

could be increased based upon criminal adjudications of delinquency as a juvenile); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 61 (Pa. 1986) (holding that a juvenile theft conviction could be used to enhance
punishment under an adult offense of retail theft, raising the offense from a summary offense to a misdemeanor); State v. Moore, 596 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1980) (holding that the trial court had
not erred in permitting the jury to consider juvenile offenses in determining whether the defendant should be
subject to the state's habitual offender statute); State v. Randle, 734 P.2d 51, 57-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that a prior juvenile adjudication could be used to determine the adult sentence).
208. See United States v. Davis, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3317, *10 (7th Cir. 1995) (deciding that the
consideration of a defendant's juvenile record is important to achieving the congressional goals of federal
sentencing, that it is not "unfair," and that it does not infringe on the defendant's due process rights); see also
United States v. Holland, 26 F.3d 26,28 (5th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the sentencing court properly considered
the defendant's juvenile record in determining his criminal history score, even though juvenile adjudications
were allegedly not considered to be convictions under Texas law); United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941, 943-45
(llth Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant's prior state youthful offender convictions could be used in
assessing criminal history points under sentencing guidelines, and that such a conviction could serve as
predicate offense to classify the defendant as career offender; the defendant was convicted and sentenced for
offenses in adult court and received and served adult sentences); United States v. Baker, 961 F.2d 1390, 139293 (8th Cir. 1992) (deciding that the sentencing court may consider prior juvenile adjudications in the
calculation of his adult sentence); United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 761-62 (1st Cir. 1990) (judging that
ajuvenile conviction may be used in tabulating a criminal history score under sentencing guidelines if the right
to counsel was made clear and was sentiently waived); United States v. Hanley, 906 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (6th
Cir. 1990) (finding that the district court and the defendant's probation officer properly considered juvenile
commitments as "confinement" in determining his criminal history category under sentencing guidelines);
United States v. Bucaro, 898 F.2d 368,372-73 (3d Cir. 1990) (deciding that the district court's increase of the
defendant's sentence range based on his juvenile record did not violate due process where a Pennsylvania
statute provided the defendant with notice that his juvenile record could be used for sentencing purposes after
a felony conviction); United States v. Kirby, 893 F.2d 867, 868 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant's
delinquency adjudication as a minor and his commission to a state agency charged with custody of delinquent
juveniles could be considered in determining his criminal history category under federal sentencing guidelines,
even though, under state law, adjudication of delinquency by a juvenile court could not be deemed a
conviction).
209. See United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a defendant's
argument that consideration ofjuvenile adjudications in the calculation of his adult sentence violated the Due
Process Clause).
210. 53 Cal. 3d 618, 809 P.2d 351,280 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1991).
211. People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 688-90, 809 P.2d 351,392-94, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692,742 (1991).
212. 108 Cal. App. 3d 253, 166 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980).
213. People v. Hubbell, 108 Cal. App. 3d 253, 255, 166 Cal. Rptr. 466,467 (1980). Hubbell additionally
contained the following language:

[D]efendant has not cited nor have we discovered any authority holding, or implying, that con-
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal in People v. Ramos 2t4 rejected the defendant's
argument that his juvenile record should not have been taken into account during

his adult sentencing and pointed to the California Rules of Court, which
include the number and seriousness of both adult convictions and juvenile
adjudications as aggravating factors.2 5
Thus, not only are juvenile proceedings increasingly taking on the characteristics of criminal trials, juvenile records are now widely considered admissible for determination of adult sentences, regardless of the extension of due process guarantees during juvenile adjudications. This makes the argument that
Three Strikes considers juvenile adjudications less compelling, since they are already often used for adult sentence enhancements. In addition, the wisdom which
refuses to view an offender's eighteenth birthday as a magic threshold beyond
which his or her prior offenses are no longer meaningful, is sound with respect
to Three Strikes and its attempts to identify recidivism.
V. ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS
A. Can CaliforniaAfford Three Strikes?
Even if the premises underlying Three Strikes are accepted, there is a point
at which reduction in crime becomes too costly for the system to bear. It is true
that crime reduction is a laudable goal and that if Three Strikes achieves what it
attempts, it will be praised as a success. However, it is equally true that the cost
of implementation must come from some source in an economy already burdened
to capacity. A study conducted by the Rand Corporation on the benefits and costs
of Three Strikes estimates that state general fund allocations to the Department
of Corrections must double from nine percent, in 1994, to eighteen percent by
2000, to accommodate the demands on the penal system brought about by AB
971 and Proposition 184.16 Yet, in order for allocations to the correctional system
to increase, revenues must increase proportionally or funds must be diverted from
programs such as higher education, health and welfare, or other social and

administrative categories. Since minimum spending for primary and secondary

sideration of an adult offender's juvenile record violates any concept of fundamental fairness. In
fact, the Arizona Supreme Court has rejected this precise contention, concluding that consideration
by a sentencing court of a convicted adult offender's juvenile record does not violate due process.
We agree with this conclusion.
Id. at 256.
214. 106 Cal. App. 3d 591, 165 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1980).
215. People v. Ramos, 106 Cal. App. 3d 591, 609-10, 165 Cal. Rptr. 179, 189-90 (1980); see CAL.
RULES OF COuRT Rules 405, 421,439-41 (1991) (containing rules regarding what the sentencing courts may
consider as aggravating factors).
216. PETER W. GREENWOOD Er AL, THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OuT: ESTIMATED BENEFrrS AND CosTs
OF CALDFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY-SENTENCING LAW 32-33 (Rand 1994).
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education is fixed by the California Constitution2 17 and must be no lower than

forty-six percent of general fund allocations, and since health and welfare
spending cannot realistically be expected to drop below the 1994 level of thirty-

five percent, higher education and miscellaneous categories must drop from their
current combined level of twenty-one percent to an impossible one percent of the
state's general fund budget.2 18
Estimates of the price of California's Three Strikes vary depending on the

study. One prediction by the State Department of Corrections estimates that the
measure will require twenty additional prisons by the year 2000 at an additional
cost of $5.7 billion per year.2t9 The Rand study predicts a current cost increase of

$3 billion for 1994 with annual expenses totaling an additional $5.5 billion for
every year thereafter.m Regardless of the source, it is obvious that implementation of Three Strikes will come with a significant cost to the state.
Texas' recidivist statute serves as an example of a law similar to Three
Strikes that has left the state unable to withstand the additional burden on its penal
system brought about by mandated life sentences for certain repeat felons. 221 The
Texas statute that, unlike California's three strikes law, considered relatively

minor property offenses as "strikes," helped to propel the state to the number one
position in the country for prison population, a ranking that led the Legislature to
revise the statute in 1983. 2 After the enactment of Texas' three strikes law, the
cost of building prisons in the state rose from $64.7 million in 1974, when those

items represented less than 1%of the state budget, to $3.7 billion in 1994, or
5.2% of the state budget?23 In addition, the cost of operating Texas' prisons
increased six times from $147.5 million in 1982 to $877.4 million in 1992.224
217. CAL CONST. art. XIIIB, § 2, art. XVI, § 8 (specifying minimum expenditures for K-12 education

as enacted by Proposition 98).
218. GREENWOOD, supra note 216, at 32-36. Californians, according to one poll, appear to be unwilling
to fund Three Strikes at the expense of the State's educational system. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Residents
Balk When Asked to Payfor "Three Strikes," L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1994, at Al (reporting the results of a Los
Angeles Times survey of 1608 Californians showing only 22% of those surveyed willing to accept cuts in the
State's higher-education budget, 72% unwilling, and 6% undecided).
219. Initiative or No Initiative, "Three Strikes" Is the Law in California, CAL. J. WKLY., Mar. 14, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; see also GREENWOOD, supra note 216, at 18 (citing the results
of a California State Department of Corrections study on the cost of implementing Three Strikes).
220. GREENWOOD, supra note 216, at 32-36; Bearing the Burden, CAL. J. WKiY., Oct. 3, 1994, available

in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
221. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West 1974); Cameron J. Rains, Recidivism and the Eighth
Amendment-Is the HabitualOffender ProtectedAgainst Excessive Punishment?,55 NOTRE DAME LAW.,
1979, at 305-15.
222. Michael S. Serrill, PrisonPopulationRises Again, But at a SlowerRate, CORRECTIONS MAO., JAN.
1978, at 20-24. The current version of Texas' recidivist statute requires felony convictions involving deadly
weapons or third-degree offenses. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d), 12.35(c) (West 1995)

223. Podger, supra note 118, at A3.
224. it. at A3. Not only economic burdens on the State of Texas, but arguments that the statute offended
notions of fundamental fairness, plagued the law from its enactment, leading one member of the Texas bench
to predict that California's Three Strikes may ultimately fail simply because ".... it just doesn't make sense
to send someone away for life for stealing a pizza."). Personal Interview with Justice Phillip D. Hardbergcr,
Fourth District Texas Court of Appeals (Mar. 16, 1995) (notes on file with the PacificLaw Journal).
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As foretold by studies such as the Rand report and the experiences of other
states like Texas, California has begun to feel the fiscal effects of Three Strikes.
Ten months of experience under Three Strikes has, in fact, shown an increased
burden on California's criminal justice system, with reports of 7400 second- and
third-strike cases filed since the law's enactment in March of 1994. z Several
California county district attorneys forecast dramatic increases in their offices'
workloads, with Los Angeles predicting a 144% increase in the number of jury
trials from 2410 in 1994 to 5875 in 1998, San Diego County forecasting a tripling
of jury6 trials, and Santa Clara County expecting an increase of 200% in trials by

jury.
* ry226

Yet, despite the hefty price tag, Californians' willingness to bear the monetary burden of Three Strikes depends on its effectiveness, with many professing
a willingness to pay for a reduction in crime if such a reduction will truly result.2 27
Whether Californians will ultimately refuse to bear the increased financial burden
brought about by Three Strikes remains to be seen and will depend on the willingness of taxpayers to bear greater monetary burdens to achieve a safer environment.22 ' Despite Californians' traditional willingness to vote for prison bond
initiatives, about half of California's voters are currently willing to pay additional
taxes to fund increased burdens on the prison system brought about by Three
Strikes.

229

An accurate assessment of Three Strikes costs must take into account the
costs of serious and violent crime already borne by society. The Rand study estimates a reduction in serious adult crime, as a result of Three Strikes, of twentyeight percent, representing 338,000 serious crimes prevented each year over the
twenty-five years following the law's enactmentY ° Based on a breakdown of the
types of crimes falling within the "serious or violent" category, Three Strikes
would, for every one million dollars of added costs, prevent four rapes, eleven
robberies, twenty-four aggravated assaults, twenty-two serious burglaries, seventeen minor burglaries, thirty-two motor vehicle thefts, fifty other thefts, and one
arson."' This represents a cost of only $16,300 per serious crime prevented.

225. See Hallye Jordan, "Three Strikes" Jamming Justice System, Jails, S. F. DLY. J., Jan. 9, 1995, at
1, 7 (quoting a statement by the State Legislative Analyst's Office); see also Gil Garcetti, "Three Strikes" Is
Working, But Who's Going to Pay the Bill?, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1994, at B7 (reporting that 6000 three strikes
cases were filed in Los Angeles County alone, during the five months following passage of AB 97 1).
226. Jordan, supranote 225, at 1, 7.
227. John G. Schmidt Jr., "Three Strikes" ProposalIs Worth the Expense, NAT. L. J., May 9, 1994, at
A20.
228. Id. at A20. Such a willingness to bear greater expenses in the name of public safety has been
demonstrated in California by the voter's traditional willingness to fund prison bond initiatives.
229. See Weintraub, supra note 218, at Al (reporting the results of a Los Angeles Times survey of 1608
Californians showing 47% of those surveyed willing to accept increased taxes, 42% unwilling to pay more
taxes, and 11% who do not know).
230. GREENWOOD, supranote 216, at 18; Bearing the Burden, supra note 220.
231. GREENWOOD, supra note 216, at 19; see id. (predicting that, for an additional $5 million, five times
the number of serious crimes plus one murder would be prevented).
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Although only short-term data are available, since the passage of AB 971 in
March of 1994, there has been an actual 7.7% decrease in the State Crime Index
which some, such as California State Attorney General Dan Lungren, attribute to
implementation of Three Strikes3 2 Thus, forecasts and current data tend to
support the intuitive reasoning of one California county district attorney who confided that criminals are smart enough to avoid a third offense when it is certain
that the result will be a life behind bars. a And the people of California have been
and may perhaps remain willing to pay a price that, if forecasts have been
accurate, is truly a bargain in saved lives and property.
VI. CONCLUSION

Three Strikes, despite prolific public debate, represents the will of the people
of California at this time.Y4 It seems that the people have weighed their concerns
for public safety against Three Strikes' alleged offenses to the economy of the
state and the rights of felons, the latter found wanting. They have, at least for the
moment, concluded that desperate times warrant desperate measures and that pub-

lic safety must be assured regardless of a broad sweep that may often imprison
the nonviolent felon with the violent, the non-serious felon with the serious. The
people have decided that if imprisonment of occasional nonviolent, non-serious
offenders with histories of violent or serious offenses will save the lives of those
who would otherwise be their final victims, the benefit is worth the cost. But,
what remains to be seen is whether public support will continue as financial burdens on California's criminal justice system continue to mount. This Note has
concluded that the inevitable costs brought about by Three Strikes will account
for its demise unless the people of California decide to pay more than lip service
and accept higher taxes or reduced spending for other government programs.
Three Strikes will face challenges in the courts and in the State Legislature
from those who believe that the law is unfair or overly broad in its inclusion of
nonviolent felons and its use of juvenile records for sentence enhancements.
These challenges will likely center around arguments similar to those discussed
in this Note and, in fact, have already appeared in briefs at the trial and appellate
level. Nevertheless, forecasts and early findings indicate that Three Strikes will

232. Bearing the Burden, supra note 220. The reader must, however, be cautioned lest he or she commit
the post hoc ergo propterhoc fallacy of attributing a cause and effect relationship to Three Strikes and the
decrease in the Crime Index merely because of their temporal relationship.
233. Interview with John W. McTigue, supranote 72.
234. See Weintraub, supra note 218, at Al (reporting the results of a Los Angeles Times survey of 1608
Californians showing 65% of those surveyed favoring Three Strikes, 21% opposing it, and 14% uncommitted).
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have its intended effect on crime. With a two-thirds vote of the Legislature or a
new ballot initiative now being necessary to modify or repeal Three Strikes, the
law is guaranteed at least some tenure in the California statute books. Perhaps it
is best, given increases in serious and violent crime, to allow Three Strikes a
chance to work before prematurely burying it, along with the victims it might
have gone on to save.

